Surge Success, But Ignore the Benchmarks

We learned today that the Bush Administration is walking away from the benchmarks originally touted as the reason for the surge. Yes the level of violence (i.e., daily attacks and U.S. casualties) in Iraq has fallen back to levels last seen in 2005. But you might want to wait before you jump on the bandwagon being driven by some in the media and rightwing blogosphere, who are celebrating this trend as firm proof that the “surge is working.” There should be no surprise that putting more troops in places like Baghdad would be accompanied by a drop off in insurgent attacks. But that was not the theory behind the surge. According to the White House and George Bush, the surge in U.S. forces was going to create the space for a political opening that would bring the conflict to an end. They made this quite clear in the White House statement released in July 2007:

While our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a transition of responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its security forces, the New Way Forward recognized that, in response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it was necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a greater role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace Iraqi efforts to provide security, but to help provide the necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government can continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts against the accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in Iraq and some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), and can meaningfully address the all-important issue of reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society. The strategy recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi Government. Amid such violence, it became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to make the difficult compromises necessary to foster reconciliation.

So how about the progress on the benchmarks?

(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the constitutional review.

The Committee is formed and it is meeting. However, it has made scant progress and a completed review does not appear to be in the offing. There are at least 50 areas in dispute.

(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba’athification reform.

Nope. No happening. Even the White House conceded that, “this is among the most divisive political issues for Iraq, and compromise will be extremely difficult. Given the lack of satisfactory progress, we have not achieved the desired reconciliation effect that meaningful and broadly accepted de-Ba’athification reform might bring about.”

(iii) Enacting and implementing Oil legislation (i.e., share the wealth).

Despite lip service to the idea, the parliament has made no substantive progress on giving the Sunnis a piece of the pie. The only significant actions on the oil front has been the Maliki government’s cancellation of a previous agreement with Lukoil, a Russian firm, to develop the oil in the Quma field in southern Iraq and Iraq’s oil ministry declaration that all crude contracts signed by the Kurdish regional authorities with foreign companies are null and void.

iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

This is on hold, with no action planned until the fall of 2008. Wonder what else might be happening the fall of 2008? Just asking.

(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial elections.

The Government of Iraq has not made measurable progress toward establishing a provincial elections law or provincial council authorities.In addition, the date for provincial elections remains up in the air. Bottom line, no progress.

(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

Um, yeah. Right. Pigs will fly first before this happens. No Progress.

(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the constitution of Iraq.

The United States, not Iraq, is taking on and fighting the militias. Maliki has shown no stomach for taking on the main Shia militia that continue to provide neighborhood security in many sectors.

(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.

Progress but. A big but. The committees up and operating remain loyal to sectarian interests as opposed to serving a national Iraqi goal. Also, during the last six months, the ethnic cleansing of Baghdad has continued, albeit with a lower body count.

(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.

The good news on this front also is mixed. Yes, there are more Iraqi troops coming forward, the brigades are workings, and they are helping secure neighborhoods in Baghdad. Unfortunately, this has not motivated the politicians to reach out to their opponents and get the political process on track. Fewer Iraqis dying is a welcome development. But it does not resolved the underlying issue of getting Shias and Sunnis to work together for the benefit of Iraq.

(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

This is still a U.S. ballgame.  But even our most elite forces–who are pressing the battle against the foreign fighters–concede that they current operating environment will not continue.  Right now they can conduct operations at will without having to consult with Iraqis.  The folks I have talked to believe that is not likely to continue to be the case by this time next year.

(xi) Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law.

Progress is spotty at best. U.S. forces have achieved some success by ensuring that units that reflect the religious make up of the local community provide the security. In other areas it is U.S. troops who are helping keep rampaging Iraqi forces in line.

(xii) Ensuring that, as Prime Minister Maliki was quoted by President Bush as saying, “the Baghdad Security Plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation.”

This objective is being achieved. Break out the champagne.

(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.

Ditto. The surge magic is working on this front. But the drop in violence is relative. The civil war continues and the insurgents have shown no sign of burying their weapons and focus on making money and feeding their families.

(xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.

Nice thing about these benchmarks. U.S. troops can accomplish tangible goals if given the resources. But achievement on this front does not translate into political progress in Iraq.

(xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently.

Yes, there has been clear progress on this front.

(xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

Nope. Not happening.

(xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

Money is being spent, that’s for sure. And some limited progress has been made in getting electricity in Baghdad on for 50% of the day. However, cholera is cropped up in some neighborhoods and the delivery of services remains more forte of the militia than the government.

(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the ISF.

There are some Iraqi security forces who are doing good work. Unfortunately their interests do not always coincide with those of the political leaders. Hence the tension. This is a benchmark not likely to be achieved any time soon.

Let’s face facts. We have not achieved even 50% of the benchmarks. Hence the question–how long can the United States afford to spend billions of dollars in Iraq–dollars that buy less every day by the way–while the U.S. economy slows and Americans lose their jobs? We are not willing to raise taxes to pay for this adventure. Not even the biggest Republican supporters of the surge will contemplate that option.

Are we willing to continue spending 21 billion dollars a month in Iraq without the majority Shia being willing to make concessions to the Sunni minority? Are we willing to maintain 100,000 plus soldiers in Iraq for the forseeable future, with the likelihood that we will continue to have at least 100 casualties a month? Barring significant political progress on the part of the Iraqis, the answer is simple–NO!