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Know Your Customer….

This piece is strictly a walk down memory lane and reflects on Wall Street interaction with overseas clients. A little something light for a weekend break. Enjoy!!

As a trader, salesman, and then sales manager, the most critically important factor in growing a business, and ultimately a franchise, was the development of deep, meaningful, and longstanding relationships. While I would try to be very customer friendly in all my roles, ultimately human nature dictates you will not get along with everybody. Simple business logic, along with strict rules of compliance, highlight the necessity to “know your customer.”

phone_ringingWhile the bulk of our mortgage business in the early to mid 1980s was located here in the United States, in the late 1980s Japanese investors became very active in our sector. This development presented some real challenges including:

1. time differential
2. type and level of engagement
3. impact of cultural differences

Allow me to expound. Given the twelve-hour time difference between New York and Tokyo, as traders we would have our Japanese sales representatives call us at home from 10PM to 4AM. If my memory serves me correctly, most of the calls came after midnight. I am a very sound sleeper, so it was indeed a challenge to orient myself and then ask our rep what the government market was doing so I could price my bid or offering on mortgage securities accordingly. More often than not, the transaction would not occur on the first call but took a few calls over the course of a half hour or so. If we executed the trade, then I would need to hedge myself by executing an offsetting trade in the government market, try to get back to sleep, and unwind the trade in the morning when I got to the office. After a month or so of this pattern, my wife wondered how long this was going to continue. From a business standpoint, I wanted to get woken every night. From the standpoint of marital bliss, hopefully not so much. As fate would have it, the business went in spurts.

As business with our Japanese clientele increased, it became very obvious that when one client entered into a transaction, a herd mentality developed and many clients would look to do the same trade. Certain bonds would get very expensive or very cheap as a result.

In the early to mid 1990s, the market got very volatile. As rates moved in large directions, both up and down, a lot of trading occurred and the business with the Japanese clients got very interesting. In executing trades, the Japanese would request and then mandate that the trade levels be adjusted to off market prices. I distinctly recall questioning management if we could do that. What about our accounting rules and the tax impact? We were then directed to execute the trade with a London counterparty at market and that entity would in turn execute with the Japanese client off market. I inquired what motivated the Japanese clients to do that? I was informed that they did not want to take a loss. Wow!! What a way to run a business.

Two other experiences with Japanese clients stand out in my mind that I would like to share with you.

In one situation with a newer client, they did not perform in delivering securities that we purchased. I informed the representative of the need to perform so we could in turn deliver them to another entity. Speed was of the essence so we could minimize the expense involved with the “fail to deliver.” Despite my beseeching, a few days went by and the incurred loss increased to more than a small amount of money. At that point, our senior representative in Tokyo called me at home and informed me that I needed to get on a conference call with the client and apologize for this issue. I responded that he must be kidding and reviewed the series of events. He informed me that the major issue was not the client’s “fail to deliver” but my degree of “honor” in doing business with them and that I needed to apologize to them. I scratched my head and asked him to explain that to me again. I informed him of the specifics once again, after which he then educated me on the finer points of Asian culture and being honorable. I did not ask him, but I was thinking what kind of honor was involved in doing “off market” trades.

The second situation is both memorable and humorous. On one Thursday evening (actually Friday morning), I received a call from our Japanese representative asking me for a quote on a particular swap. After giving him the level, I went back to bed. He called back, not too surprisingly, a half hour later. This went on for another couple of hours. Somewhat bleary eyed at that point, I inquired why he was actually calling me instead of the trader who had the primary responsibility for that sector. The representative said, “John’s wife told me to call you because John’s “loaded.”" I chuckled at that. When I discovered the size of the trade, I realized this would be the single largest transaction that I would price in the course of my career and here I was doing it at 3:30AM from my kitchen table. When the trade was done, my adrenaline rushed like never before. I showered, shaved, and was on a train to the city within 30 minutes. I was at my desk at 5:15AM, knowing we were going to have a very good day. “John” rolled in at 8:30AM. Prior to informing him of the trade, I asked what he thought of the price level between those securities. He asked, “why?” I informed him of the multi-billion dollar trade. He sobered up pretty quickly. In the spirit of friendship, I shared a piece of the trade with him but he realized that for him those Thursday night drinks were VERY expensive.

In summary, the lessons I learned throughout my engagement with Japanese clients were the differences in culture and the need to adapt accordingly. Obviously, for anybody involved in trade of any kind, whether international or domestic, the necessity to “know your customer” is of paramount importance.

LD

  • George

    Thanks for the advice!

  • fiscalliberal

    Larry – since you were in the pits as a trader, I am curious in terms of compensation. Was it commission or bonus at the end of the year?

    Do you have a view on limiting bonuses if your bank took money.

    Do I remember it correctly that you were with JP Morgan. I was reading a ariticle that alluded to JP Morgan haveing a lot of CDS exposure due to the fact that they were requested by the government to take over Bear Stearns. CNBC seems to put a lot of stock in what Jamie Diamond says. In a Davos interview he said that, they were looking at Bear Stearns and probably with a little more diligance would have walked from the deal. However the government asked them to take them over, and they did. That said he reaffirmed, they did not need the government TARP money, but were asked to take it to preserve the image of the other banks.

    So – if the government limits the bonuses of JP Morgan, and they did not need the money, I could imagine hard feelings could develop.

    Any insight to the above comments?

  • Sassy

    That’s a funny story about your partner John.
    At 3:30 in the morning, I would tell a burglar to carry on and close the door on his way out. Ha…I don’t do late nights!

  • sowsear

    Very enlightening, hearing about those cultural differences. It looks though that underneath it all, “players” anywhere will try to scam things a bit.(And tell you to apologize!)
    I envy you your experiences.

  • fiscalliberal

    So – here you are, retired, blogging on a Saturday evening. Any comments from the significant other?

    :-)

  • LD

    Fiscal…

    Different shops handled compensation differently. At my first shop, First Boston, compensation was VERY subjective. The variables included profitability, seniority, reviews, and unfortunately politics.

    At Bear Stearns, it was VERY objective. Each individual trader would have a gross revenue minus fixed expenses (phones, seat charge, research charge, etc) minus variable expenses (sales commissions paid, ticket charges based on volume) to generate a net revenue number. We got paid a percentage of that net. Very little need for conversation. The numbers were the numbers.

    In addition to the payout almost every shop on the street has a percentage of a person’s compensation “held back” in order to disincent them from leaving. This worked as follows: typically the total comp was split 66% in cash and 33% in stock. The stock would vest over a 3 yr time frame. Meaning that you would receive 1/3rd of your total stock accrual each year. I am probably not being totally clear but it meant that after 3 yrs you basically had a full yrs worth of compensation tied up in company stock and it got paid over 3 yrs. If you wanted to leave a prospective firm would need to make you whole from the stock that you would be forced to walk away from. This stock accrual was known as the “golden handcuffs”. It became very difficult to leave a firm and walk away from the stock. When I got the opportunity to leave JPM on 2006, I wanted the flexibility and I took it. I was evry lucky to get out when I did and not have to live through the anxieties of the last few years. I can now work on a number of other interests and initiatives.

    Fro the 80s to the 90s, almost every large shop went from some sort of commission payout to a strict salary bonus format so management could retain greater control over expenses.

    IMO the problem with the compensation system is two fold. The structure is skewed on certain desks for traders to swing for the fences. If they knock it out of the park they get paid huge sums. If they strike out they walk or get fired. The problem lies in the fact that in swinging for the fences they often take and leave inordinate risks in the books. To the extent that there are remaining positions in the book, the firm should set aside reserves against those positions and detract those reserves from the bonus pool.

    For a trader that has legitimately made significant revenues and totally squared their books then IMO he or she deserves to be paid fairly for those revenues generated.

    In this process the firm should allocate capital in a more fiscally appropriate fashion.

    Mr. Jamie Dimon right now has the greatest level of credibility in the industry. Believe me, in our mortgage business we were sharing with the powers that be the level of profits being generated in the sub-prime space in the 2000-2006 era (remember Dimon only came to JPM in summer of 2004) and prior management and Dimon both mandated that JPM was not going to be a player in that space. They were prudent and accurate in that call and it has saved the institution in a huge way. JPM is currently the strongest bank in the industry.

    JPM has also been the biggest player in the CDS space. That said, the risk systems and risk oversight are tremendous. They measured risk not only in terms of market exposure but also counterparty credit exposure as well.

    I do not know for a fact but I feel very strongly that the powers that be in Washington are in very close contact with Mr. Dimon on a regular basis.

    JPM did not want government money. You can rest assured that many people there are not all that happy.

    The problem now is not a JPM issue it is an industrywide issue.

    Remember, as we wrote on Novemerb 12th “The Wall Street Model is BROKEN…and as Mr. Maloney said it is not only broken, it’s SMASHED.

  • ChooChooMagoo

    Thanks for an entertaining read.

  • LD

    Fiscal…under the “for what it’s worth category”, I am retired from Wall Street but I am not retired. I am working on a number of different interests and projects.

    …and having fun writing here at NQ and trying to spread some insights on these econoomic issues…

    My better half just ran the kids out to a movie. She and I saw Revolutionary Road last night. Not my idea of entertainment.

  • sowsear

    Same is true for Bank of America. When they did diligence on Merrill Lynch they weren’t impressed, but the gov. feared worldwide panic if ML should fail and told BOA that they would compensate them in the bailout. I’m almost sure that BOA investment bankers received their bonuses, although business has been a “little off”.

  • socalannie

    I worked for a Japanese Co. in the 80′s & 90′s. It had its ups & downs, but was usually entertaining. My bosses often started out the day hungover & then were usually drinking by lunchtime & hilarious in the afternoon. Japanese businessmen work hard and party hard.

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