Current Article

Larry Speaks Out on Intelligence Reform

By SusanUnPC on January 13, 2008 at 10:56 PM in Uncategorized

Catch this fascinating video of “ex-CIA agent Larry Johnson” questioning UCLA professor Amy Zegart about her research.

When it comes to the spy game, Amy Zegart wants to break rules

Or maybe it’s more accurate to say that Amy Zegart wants to change the rules. After six years of intensive research, Zegart doesn’t think U.S. intelligence agencies have learned the vital lessons of 9/11. But she doesn’t agree with all the conclusions of the 9/11 Commission, either. Watch the dialog heat up as ex-CIA agent Larry Johnson questions Zegart about her research.

Amy Zegart is a UCLA faculty member and an expert on intelligence reform – named one of the “top 10” in that field by The National Journal.

Larry Johnson is a tough critic of his former agency, the CIA. He has voiced his opinions on NPR, CNN, Fox News, NBC’s Today Show and the BBC. Johnson’s attitude can be summed up by the title of his blog: “No Quarter.”

Our video brings Johnson and Zegart together to discuss the premise of her latest book, “Spying Blind: The CIA, The FBI, and the Origins of 9/11.” When Johnson questions Zegart, he’s not a talk show host lobbing softballs: he’s a tough, knowledgeable insider. So he strikes some sparks from Zegart: watch the video and see for yourself.

Here are Zegart’s credentials: “An associate professor in the School of Public Affairs, Amy Zegart worked on the National Security Council staff during the Clinton administration, served as a foreign policy adviser to the Bush-Cheney 2000 presidential campaign, and has testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.”

Mango

I didn’t see any sparks, although near the end it seemed that Zegart was sticking to institutional excuses for the CIA rather than going with Larry’s repeated insinuations that somebody just plain didn’t do their job.
Retired

The video was excellent, I shall have to read the book. I couldn’t help but think of a meeting of senior officers that I attended in 1998 or 1999. At the meeting, various “reform” and reorganization studies that had been done over the last decade and a half were distributed to those present. The entire stack (wrapped with thick rubber bands) given to each of us was about seven inches high. The reports all pretty much came to the same conclusion, albeit in differnt ways, with differnt terms and buzzwords, and different charts and illustrations.

The most insightful comment made at that meeting came from a wise colleague who, like most of us, had read all of the reports when they first came out during the past 15 years. “This will make a great door stop” he said, meaning that the most senior management of the Agency wouldn’t have the will to order and implement the reforms. And we all knew that he was right.
Retired

Oh, by the way, I happened to be there when the “declaration of war” was made. Those who were also there recall that there was a plea for the best and brightest to apply to the Counterterrorism Center (CTC).

Two things happened. First, the DO “barons” went to the best and brightest that were in Hqs and advised them that an assignment to CTC would never be as good as being successful in your home division (i.e., Latin America, Near East, etc.) because your home division controlled your promotion. For the best and the brightest who happened to be deployed overseas, secure telephones were used to deliver the same message (so that there wouldn’t be any record of outright bureaucratic defiance).

When it comes to being designed to resist change, the Bureau may be the chanps, but the Agency certainly can hold its own.
http://NoQuarterUSA.net Larry Johnson

I’ve forwarded Amy the comment. Great points Sr. Retired.
Sidney O. Smith III

I’d suggest questioning — or if you prefer, cross examining — Prof. Zegart on two cases studies to determine if they support or undermine her thesis. The first case study is the career (and unheeded plea) of John P. O’Neill. The second is that of Rick Rescorla.
Kathleen

Wired has had some great articles about the wiretapping
program’s…. I keep remembering Gonzales referring to multiple programs

http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/fbis-wiretap-ne.html

FBI’s Wiretap Network Revealed And Request for Reader Document Analysis

http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/top-spy-asked-t.html
Mr.Murder

We can’t blame individuals, yet we constantly are told how dangerous “nineteen individuals armed with box cutters” were,

should there be a sin tax on syntax?

The FBI and DoJ were busy sharpening the dull knife of hemp eradication, much like their return from prohibition, itself a watershed example of how to best fumble. Tommy Chong was a higher priority than terrorists. That’s right, burnouts in tie dyes were more a threat to leadership sensibilities than terrorists hijacking planes to use as weapons, even though the same lackey behind the new crusade(John Ashcroft, acting AG) decided to stop flying on commercial planes, the POTUS had anti air missiles on his roof at the GOA meeting in Italy, and in America at Florida the week of his Goat Story…
Who.Could.Have.Imagined?

This goes back to the problems we had crafting response to intelligence. We already had declared war on Al Qaeida in ’98? Well perhaps we need to see the requests to Congress on how to deal with these items. Was Newt Gingrich still screaming “Wag the Dog” and blocking action against Al Qaeida? Certainly the Congressional record has extensive archives of their priorities. Let’s see how much influence Hastert’s buddies had at the time. Which of those former staffers for the same people who fumbled became appointments, office holders, party levers, or work on the contract side of our current model?

Part of putting Tenet in dual capacities was to shape the reorganization of the CIA and the IC’s terror response. Why he, as DCI, put this on the back burner when the new POTUS arrived is something he should appear to answer in Comittee.

One reason decentralization fit so well was that it allowed the CIA’s purpose to be consistent across the changing of regimes in DC and elsewhere. Making it entirely top-down would make it more likely the next Bush could railroad things through even more than the last Clown in Chief did. Fool me twice… shame on Yoo.

So experience matters in the CIA and in fighting terror? Perhaps Barack Obama would be enlightened to know this fact…

The FBI seems to work closest with the DoJ. Get Ashcroft on the stand and find out why the FBI was not running to maximum effeciency. Perhaps they can discuss the focus upon prosecuting Democrats as pattern basis background for the failure to respond when red flags were up. This isn’t new, as Larry notes the Lincoln Tunnel bombing was stopped by the FBI, a diffferent President was in office though. Let’s see the after action reports.

Let’s see who the field offices reported to. Which appointed lackey was pushing these reports back down the ladder? Why no Comittee discussion?
There’s too much activity at the analyst threshold for the FBI not to have been aware at higher levels. Were these people being tailed allowed to pass for the use of thier groups to shape other means? What opponents and allies did we aim to steer these groups to, and at what time? Let’s see the background reviews of the action/after action reports, and overall assessements and personnel evaluations that related to antiterror efforts, across the boards. Let’s note the events reviewed and their proximity to the two-year and four year marks bordering elections in the last 20 years…

As for the PDB, look no further than PNAC. Wag the Document? As noted above, Condi could have imagined, as noted by the pre-emptive measures of placing surface to air missiles on the President’s sleeping quarters abroad and in Florida.

At least six countries considered the inner circle of our security apparatus warned America before 9-11 that something was about to happen. This includes members of NATO. Critical review of those diplomatic assertions should be done, perhaps Colin Powell and his Chief of Staff could discuss their response.

Finally the fact that 9-11′s lessons took back seat to Bush’s desire to push profiteering over performance led to his theatening a veto of legislation that obligated America to consider union contracting and it traditional bid process. Nice of Congress to forgo security and instead co-opt its sense of duty to the bottom line Bush paradox of anti-union contracting coupled with no-bid graft.

Let the grown ups take charge again. Get Hillary in office and let the spooks go back to being spooks. Then we’ll see how much the minority party wants to try and be an obstacle…
S. Markom

I watched the video and will buy the book now.

For me what this has done is further reinforce my disgust with two votes I made for Bill Clinton. Government departments and organizations are no different than a major corporation. They are run, ultimately, by one individual. That individual must have the vision and clarity of how the company is performing now and where it is planned to be in the future.

If a corporation is not performing properly then it must have a CEO who not only understands what changes are necessary but the ability to implement them.

Her analysis takes place during a period almost entirely during the Clinton administration. In the post-Cold war period where terror attacks were becoming a major concern (as she said) it was up to the government CEO, Bill Clinton, to have the ability to address those problems and not to expect them to happen on their own. There was a lot of criticism of Clinton not caring about our intelligence capabilities and one would hope that is a myth.

My point is that had Bush Sr., who had once run the CIA, been re-elected he would have not only recognized the problems but he could have better implemented reforms more effectively and quickly.
TeakWoodKite

Quest had a jingle..”Anytime, anywhere…” not this time eh?
TeakWoodKite

After watching the video I am struck by the idea advanced, that the relationship between the field offices and HQ was dysfunctional on a “mechanical” / technical level. What is the evolution of the 56 field office communications to HQ laterally vertical and horizontal? Was this a left over from Hoover? In a spoke and wheel org it is the hub that makes it useful. If the hub is secretive or deceptive it then falls to personal relationships to communicate and that makes things compartmented, intended on not.

Can anyone shed any light on why the good professor thinks the Aug. PDB was a “shody piece of work”?
I refuse to think that having briefed Rice directly. That that would not have reached the “decider” with in the hour. So seeing a PDB a full week later would not be new. Considering they only got the principles together 9/10/01 (?) What is the PDB supposed to do? Provide the “tip of the day”?