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Reason For Optimism . . . Not So Fast

Last week we wrote that the prospects for the implementation of a “bad” bank (I designated it Bank Transition) seemed to be increasingly likely. My post, “Reason For Optimism,” highlighted the fact that a Bank Transition would facilitate the clearing of toxic assets from bank balance sheets. In so doing, the “transitioning” process should promote an environment in which banks can feel more comfortable lending to qualified borrowers.

An update on this “Bad Bank” concept started to break yesterday. Regrettably, the government and banks can not seem to agree conceptually on the necessary steps to launch this bank.

In lieu of the bad bank, the main initiative now being proposed is the concept of the government “guaranteeing” the losses on these assets from a certain point. I view this approach in a less positive light.

I believe strongly that this insurance approach is the equivalent to the Japanese style approach used in their banking crisis of the early 90s. Instead of recognizing losses to a certain point and then transferring them, the insurance approach puts a much greater emphasis on “buying time” to generate revenues as a means of increasing capital within the system.

Buying time strikes me as prolonging the period of lower growth and lessened opportunities.

We will see what comes out of Washington on these topics, but if in fact this is the primary approach for addressing toxic assets, I no longer have that “reason for optimism.”

LD

  • fiscalliberal

    LD – I wonder if the issue is that they are apprehensive on the number of assets that are going to become toxic with the deteriorating economy.

    With that apprehension, the government is going to bid low. The banks want more and the government knows they will be critisized for paying to much.

    I also suspect the government knows with a deteriorating world economy, the foreign money for our debt is going to dry up, hence the interest cost will become prohibitive.

    Who knows, I am evolving to just letting the bad banks fail, so the good one’s can re establish lending.

    However, that said, after hearing the full SEC testimony yesterday, I am beginning to wonder what part of our government is working.

  • ChooChooMagoo

    Buying time strikes me as prolonging the period of lower growth and lessened opportunities.

    I’m not sure I’m following how this new approach works. Are they insuring to lessen the pain, but also lessen the responsibility by not taking over.

    • LD

      Choo Choo….the insurance policy would work so that the government absorbs losses beyond a certain point. For instance once a security loses another 20% from its current valuation on the banks’ books, the governmetn will step in and abosrb future losses.

      This approach prolongs the entire flushing process, leaves the assets on the banks books, and leaves bank management in charge of the situation.

      Time….time…time…

      As a result, I think future growth and the speed with which the economy may turn are diminished.

  • Gary McGowan

    I like this short Jan. 21 video commentary:

    “Bad Bank!”
    http://www.larouchepac.com/news/2009/01/21/lpactv-bad-bank.html

    (The low bitrate version is adequate even full screen.)

    • ChooChooMagoo

      Thanks GMcG. Very interesting and thought provoking. But now I have more questions.

  • ChooChooMagoo

    By the way LD – appreciate all the updates as things develop. And your write ups on “the Man” – Harry Markopolos. To bad the media haven’t felt it worth their time, except for brief snippet and summary (if at all). The hearing would real rouse the masses.

    • LD

      Choo Choo….you should enjoy today’s piece.

      Happy Friday!!

  • lark

    I don’t think you should have had reasons for optimism either way. for the government to try to hold deflation by artificial means is immoral. Deflation is as much of a right as inflation is. Losing is just as much of a right as winning and regret is as much of a right as greed.

    • ame

      So…You’re on the fence?

      • lark

        No. I have given my answer to the problem since they surfaced in August and Sept of last year. I believe that the function of the government or the Treasury Dept is to organize the process of bringing the toxic assets into the market and provide for a steady process of auctioning the assets in an orderly, rational, inform, logical, formal, and determined manner.

        I would be against bringing all the assets at once or in a disorderly and disarrayed manner. But truthfully and with conviction. The government must not allow for the banking and institutional system to manage the process on their own or to manipulate the process to their own benefit. The process must be fair and balanced but the benefits must fall on those who bid and have the cash to buy those assets.

        The most important duty of the government is to see that ownership or title be conveyed legally, honestly and fairly from those who auction them to those who buy them. Because many shenanigans can appear to damage the conveyance of title. So government must insist on a well managed and transparent method of conveying title.

        That’s the role of government. That’s what I advocate. Nothing more, nothing less.

      • lark

        The answer to your question may appear later since it does not want to appear now.

      • LD

        Ame….not sure if your question is directed my way.

        I am going to attach my January 2009 Market Review, which highlights my market calls.

        http://www.noquarterusa.net/blog/2009/01/30/january-2009-review/

  • fiscalliberal

    LD – it should be interesting to see if the government bad bank insurance program collects premiums like the FDIC does while security matures. A unknown factor is, do these toxic assets being insured have credit defaults behind them.

    The other unknown factor is, for those that the government purchases, how will the government handle the renewal of the defaulting loans in the securities. Writing down principle can increase losses.

    I sure hope some day, some one writes a book about what went on in this mess. The story could be as bad as the SEC Madow fiasco.

    Another question. A large part of the credit defaults were nonsence bets. I wonder if the government has nullified them because of the underwriters not having the capital to pay for the nonsense event default. Again – so much going on and after watching the SEC hearing yesterday, one cannot have a comfortable feeling that anything right is being done.

    • lark

      The government insurance or guarantee may create a title problem. How much would you like to have a title problem on the asset you just bought from an auctioneer or short seller?

      • fiscalliberal

        Lark-I am not sure that I undestand your point. Do I understand that a person buy’s title insurance and it is the responsiilty of the insurer to see that the title is clear. If it is not the insurance goes up and you can decline the sale.

        If the bank sold short, do they not clear the title of this stuff? It’s been 25 years since I bought my current house. I am interested in your point as I expect to down size and certainly might encounter something of this nature.

        • lark

          Title insurance does not work exactly like you described it but close. It does not insure that the title is sound but that if it is unsound it will pay damages. Of course they require a title search to reduce their exposure.

          A government guarantee may actually cloud a title. Who did it guarantee value, on what basis, etc. Someone who looses may want to come back later and sue against the loss based on the previous guarantee if this or that or if they feel they had damages. I think a government guarantee against loss of value is a problem for any title holder down the line. It may be a panacea for lawyers. You would definitely need to hire a lawyer if you buy a property with a previous government issued market value guarantee.

          The best thing to me is for the government to guarantee that the toxic properties are disposed off in an orderly and determined way.

          • fiscalliberal

            Thank you

    • LD

      Fiscal….

      No doubt that plenty of these assets comprise a variety of CDS which exacerbate the implied leevrage.

      Your point about the “renewal of defaulted loans” is a VERY good one. In speaking with a former colleague he has informed me that institutional investors have largely stopped buying mortgage private label (Jumbo, ALT-A, and the like) because of fears of “principal reduction”.

      Unintended consequences are enormous and unknown.

  • beebop

    They are selling the Obama coins on the ObamaCoinNetwork.com … I find it hysterical that they have to explain that the coins that are first minted will have the lowest numbers on them …. really? ROFLMFAO … only 19.75 and projected to be worth $175 … maybe he can save our economy …. hahahahahahahahaha

    • Ferd Berfle

      LMAO. This is what passes for sophistication and intelligence nowadays. Wow. So if I buy one, do I get the second free? Or even better, if they had a contest, would the first prize would be one coin and the second prize two of the pieces of crap?