That would check an unpopular replacement from within the ranks, and make the parties begin to work with neighbors in deciding who moves up.

The traditional Constitution of Kenya is in shambles and might not effectively apply to the nature of replacements within traditional means. This new appointment/replacement way could break across standing gerrymanders by including neighboring groups, and play against traditional fractures within parties. I’d suggest going beyond the traditional political map as well, strictly in approving appointments, and selecting replacements or making those the candidates for political race by traditional ballot in the post vacated.

Approved appointments create a void to replace in traditional ranks, moving from within the structure in place is crucial because reliance on prior models simply brings the same problems to point at later times, or presently. Making local polemics learn to work with neighboring rivals could pattern better, cohesive leadership for the future. Breaking traditional gerrymanders resulting from the current political map can effect change at the entry levels to transform civic models, reinforcing those models makes it more likely that neighborhoods redraw based on ethnic leadership.

Three parties/districts vote, two largest remain for the final ballot, the one who wins the final ballot has to work from within ranks the of vacated position’s constituency.

Then traditional leaders can distance selves from results, having taken the new positions, with additional endorsement by the executive selecting from traditional poles. The approval is a new model that loosens the rigid party/post structure involved in appointment, so it is less likely to reinforce continued static emotion from the structure in place now, but still reflects the main influence of accepted leadership, nominatively so.

In either instance you are looking at ways to ignore standing fractures or punt the problem down the road. Accelerate the item regionally and try to use that as a leapfrog from previous results. That can address the problem and accelerate interactive governmental effectiveness. The old model wants a strong man and a yes/no answer to meet our new decentralized model of business,NGO, and union diplomats. Why not make the government piece of the puzzle we deal with decentralize somewhat to meet the same demands? You’ll find shared interest from groups satisfy the need for continued engagement beyond the whims of whichever empty suits plays little Napoleon for the time being.

State sponsors have the capital to sweeten such deals and bring all interests into the plan.

Decentralized models can be penetrated easier from a security standpoint as well, no?

It would be nice to see the transition occur, but one gets the suspicion too many grudges will be harbored. Blood on blood, etc.

Are there any legitimate coalitions or dissent groups able to be part of the transition to a level it would mitigate the kind of strong majority rule we’ve seen?

In effect, is it a Republic or Democracy?

What kind of legislative balance is there?

Often we’ve seen the model put out as a cookie cutter, a upper/lower body legislature. One used to concede items and satisfy smaller representations to a point things can run for the vested interest. The other made as a way to impose the patronage of the ruling party and majority ranks.

I’d suggest the NGO and think tanks try to find a new model. A third legislative body within the model. One that is a system of appointed positions, the name members of major parties will go there. Give it one of the key items from the lower and upper bodies for steering items and endorsing policy. Don’t remove those from the other parties, just give it a new area to cultivate the policy and help keep things together. Have its membership subject to a voting review similar to a vote of confidence. Both of these from the lower body and the civil ranks as a hedge against its over use, and as a way to motivate more broad unity when drastic change is necessary.

Doubtful the parties in power and major dissent would oppose that since they’d attach name value to the persons appointed. Then lower diplomatic ranks are freed as the positions in the other legislative bodies are freed. This puts increasing pressure on policy change, though old liners will abate change, more secure in their new posts. Thus you can mitigate some reactionary or emotional effect from the pressure of transition.

The third body would also have a way of accelerating diplomatic functions regionally and strategically. A secure ‘old guard’ with titles of privilege, more symbolic than active, with influence over helping shape the major items tasked legislative bodies. It should help the business as usual money interest, the partisan political ranks find voice through faster vertical promotion in the established ranks and trusted identity voice in the new chapter, and the major issues needed to accelerate change and progress can flow without as much static when the major representative phases break down.

This could pattern greater work with NGO on the established name value of said leaders, and provide additional diplomatic contacts for our own ambassadors, a line that moves along those of the national Executive’s structure, but one with greater potential to effect real change, in ways that would move results upward. Then you can work change up and down from the executive and legislative aspects. It would fit along the lines of OAS and our Congressional trips, and still enough major political clout from their Executive appointment obligations to work parallel to State’s traditional emphasis and procedure.

Everyone wants yes/no and black/white answers, we’re saying that can’t work, then why make governments into yes/no models? Add the third channel, give it foreign influence, and then use it as a way to work off the two extremes in the old model to find working middle ground.

The parties that are considered sponsor states should greatly consider this. We’ve seen multiple power modules accelerate EU development and engagement. Let’s cultivate the ability for major states and players to work along those kind of lines.

What kept them out this time?