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AIG and LTCM

***Cross-posted from my blog, Sense on Cents. Come by and visit!

A precursor to the turmoil roiling our economy and markets today occurred on a smaller, but certainly very dramatic, scale in 1998. The meltdown of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management brought the market to its knees at the time. LTCM was effectively taken over by a consortium of Wall Street banks at the behest of New York Federal Reserve Chairman, William McDonough. The firms injected approximately $3 billion dollars in order to stabilize LTCM and then unwound it in an orderly fashion.

The lessons learned in the LTCM crisis were obviously not learned well enough because we are experiencing them again a multiple hundred fold. The centerpiece of our current fiasco is AIG (known at Sense on Cents as “Ain’t It Great”).

The dramatic story of Long Term Capital Management is captured in a book I strongly recommend for anybody interested in the history of the financial markets. When Genius Failed, by Roger Lowenstein, is a great read and truly captures the intrigue, egos, and tension of that period. As the current turmoil unwinds I look forward to the books published on this period, as well.

While books can be entertaining, they are not the vehicle for learning real lessons. Personal experience is always the best teacher.

I dealt personally with the partners of LTCM during the development of their firm, throughout its 4 year duration, and its downfall. LTCM operated in a totally quantitative style where the models embedded in black boxes dictated transactions. AIG did the same.

LTCM thought they had a diversified book of exposures across foreign and domestic sectors of both the credit and equity markets. AIG did the same, although their greatest exposure centered on the sub-prime mortgage space.

LTCM viewed themselves as both bigger and smarter than the market itself. AIG did the same.

LTCM totally mispriced liquidity risk, that is the risk that another human being needed to provide liquidity for the unwinding of a trade. AIG did the same.

LTCM was not officially bailed out. Although the principals and investors in that fund were largely wiped out, the firm did not outright fail as the consortium of banks injected capital. Did the moral hazard of that experience play into the AIG debacle? This point will be debated in the months and years ahead.

One angle of the LTCM meltdown that has received very little public attention over the years was the manner in which Wall Street banks managed their own books and capital during that period. In short, the senior executives of the consortium of banks involved in saving the system during the LTCM meltdown became totally aware of LTCM’s positions. That confidential information was tremendously valuable because those positions obviously needed to be unwound. In layman’s terms, if I know you are in a position of having to sell something, I can drive the market lower in your face so you are forced to sell at an ever lower price. It is widely speculated that Goldman Sachs effectively front ran the unwinding of LTCM’s positions and made hundreds of millions of dollars in the process.

Fast forward to today’s situation with AIG. The Wall Street banks certainly know what AIG’s positions are along with the fact that the government is trying to unwind these positions. Do you think Wall Street traders are sitting idly by as AIG tries to unwind this mess? Why has AIG needed an ever increasing amount of government money? Very simply, the markets that AIG has exposure to are continuing to weaken as they try to exit positions. Why are they weakening? It would be naive to think that other Wall Street traders are not once again front running AIG much as Goldman Sachs’ traders supposedly front ran LTCM in 1998.

How can the government prevent any front running on behalf of Wall Street banks? Regulators should be scouring the trading records of every AIG counterparty on a regular basis. Are the regulators doing this? The government and regulators are certainly stretched very thin. Are Wall Street traders taking advantage of the situation? It would be naive to think they are not.

Trust but verify!! Actually, why should we trust a crowd that has provided no basis for trust to this point? Let’s just verify!!

LD

  • WMCB

    Wow. Excellent take that I had not thought about. It would explain a lot.

  • TeakwoodKite

    I think the verification is given from the overwhelming sense of Deja Vu.

    It’s like an old western where a couple of cowboys see buzzards circling in the distance. Dare they investigate?

  • bayareavoter

    The outrage about the AIG bonuses and Congress’ taxation of them are just distractions really.

    As you describe what happened in the ’80s and compare it to today it seems we should look behind the curtain!

    Geitner had since last fall and especially since November to pull a plan and team together. Is he too entrenched in Wall St or does he just need more people working for/with him?

  • Concerned Citizen

    The AIG bonuses everyone is in a lather about are less than $200 million. We’ve sunk $170 BILLION down this rat hole, paying off sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds and foreign banks — the counter parties to these derivatives.

    There are another $1.2 TRILLION of toxic derivatives left to go at AIG.

    Why should taxpayers be on the hook for this stupidity?

    Is it really fair to sign our kids up to a lifetime of slavery to pay this off?

    Let them all go bankrupt! Protect depositors at banks and let the rest fail.

  • WhatNow

    AIG created the mess they’re in and should exist gracefully or fix their own mess. Shame on them.

    The Obama administration needs to clean it’s own house before they tell other corporations what to do. Geithner knew what was going on with AIG back in November and so did Obama, Pelosi, Frank, Reid, Benake,Dodd and the Bush Administration. Yes, TARP was a joint effort back in 2008.

    Wouldn’t it be a nice CHANGE if the Obama administration forgo the payback for campaign funds and concentrate on the people of America?

  • gire

    LTCM was an “original sin” it’s bailout should have exposed how dangerously leveraged an interconnected the banking system is. THe LTCM bailout taught the markets that they did not have to worry about counterparty risk on lending to traders/bankers because the government would step in and bailout creditors. AIG is LTCM on steroids. Irresponsible firms like Goldman, et al. purchased CDS insurance contracts from AIG that were not properly underwritten. Once again, there is no penalty for stupid lending. Can you guess why there is 30:1 leverage in the industry?