Beware of the Saudis and the British
By pm317 on March 23, 2009 at 11:30 AM in Afghanistan, Current Affairs, Pakistan, Taliban
So says the article entitled “The Motives Behind the Afghan Peace Talks” written by Haroun Mir, co-director of Afghanistan Center for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS). Mr. Mir starts the article with this:
The recent Afghan peace talk with the Taliban, initiated by Saudi Arabia and sponsored by British authorities has been kept highly secret.
In fact the rationale behind talking to the insurgents in order to separate them from Al-Qaeda is accepted by the Afghan people and endorsed by the coalition forces in Afghanistan.
However, all recent attempts in bringing the insurgents into the negotiation table have failed. The recent Saudi mediation efforts should be scrutinized by the US authorities before they endorse it as American interest in the region differs from the interests of Saudi Arabia and Britain.
Melanie Phillips’ blog (based on a summary of Mir’s article here) first brought this to my attention.
The article reveals new old players in the Saudis and the British but not necessarily on the US side with regard to Afghanistan and Pakistan. We all know how the Taliban found safe haven in Pakistan when they were chased out of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, as Mr. Mir points out after receiving “.. financial assistance from a complex network of charities originated in the wealthy Gulf countries.” Instead of getting Pakistan to completely root them out, Bush went after Iraq and gave Taliban an opportunity to reemerge in the North Western territories of Pakistan. Now they are threatening Pakistan’s stability as well as Afghanistan’s. With the new US administration trying to put the focus back on Afghanistan and putting pressure on Pakistan to dismantling the terror networks, Mr. Mir writes that the goals of the Saudis and the British do not necessarily align with the US. They both want the US to treat Pakistan with kid gloves for reasons of their own. Yes, both are talking about indirectly appeasing Taliban and Al-Qaeda by their timid reaction towards Pakistan.
What is the Saudi role in this?
For Saudis, Pakistan’s military has always been a vital ally which offered its conventional and nuclear arsenal as a protection for the Kingdom. In exchange they have provided substantial financial assistance to the military. And a radical Sunni movement such as the Taliban, figures Riyadh, would serve as a natural foe against Shiite Iran in the region. Therefore, the kingdom was among the three countries, which recognized Taliban’s government in Kabul.
Saudis are not yet ready to disengage from their investment in the Taliban. A tolerant democracy in Afghanistan would undermine their conservative vision of Islam. In the past decades, Riad has invested more money in religious madrassas than in economic reconstruction in Afghanistan.
That leaves Saudi Arabia’s recent engagement in an Afghanistan peace solution dubious. They have remained passive in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and didn’t offer their assistance to Afghanistan as they might have, as a leader of the Islamic world. Afghans are not sure if Saudis recent involvement to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table is a genuine effort or a new strategy to nurture their protégé in an Afghanistan after NATO’s presence.
“Saudis are not yet ready to disengage from their investment in the Taliban.” All I can say is, Damn the Saudis.
For the British, instability in Pakistan may hit close to home and they are pussyfooting around the problem trying to save their own skin. Mr. Mir recognizes the fear in Britain’s approach:
The prospect of Pakistan becoming a failed state is looming high for the international community. Britain and Saudi Arabia are very concerned about the future of Pakistan for different reasons. Britain is home to more than two million Pakistanis. The London terrorist attacks of 7/7 were planned and executed by British citizens of Pakistani origin, trained in the terrorist camps in Pakistan. Therefore, Britain chiefly prizes stability in Pakistan, fearing that a failed-sate Pakistan would be too heavy a burden at home.
Britain’s knowledge of the Afghanistan and Pashtun tribal belt in Pakistan dates back to 18th century. But the old Pashtun tribal structure vanished during the past three decades of conflict in Afghanistan. The current British effort of reaching out to the Taliban has already failed. Since British forces moved to Helmand, negotiating a secret truce with the Taliban, the situation in the province has further deteriorated. The British zeal to negotiate with the insurgents would certainly buy valuable time for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to better regroup and expand their operations in relatively stable provinces of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The article concludes that “The new US administration should beware of the British and Saudis’ objective in the region, which consists of saving Pakistan at the cost of abandoning Afghanistan. While the rest of the world seems to have ceased caring about bringing justice to the architects of 9/11, the US government has a commitment to do so, saving Afghanistan from the Taliban resurgence in the process.”
“Saving Pakistan at the cost of abandoning Afghanistan,” means appeasing Taliban and Al-Qaeda which is not an acceptable solution.
Haroun Mir was talking about how a war against the Taliban was winnable in an article in 2007. It is worth revisiting that article on the idea of bolstering Afghan Army to defend against Taliban.
Media coverage of the fighting in Afghanistan fuels perceptions in the West that NATO forces are facing an eventual debacle, but in reality the situation on the ground is not quite so grim. Indeed, the war against the Taliban is winnable, provided NATO reconsiders its current military strategy and grooms the Afghan National Army to take over the fight.
Compared to the past three decades of continuous conflicts, Afghans are better off today. Most people here recognize that fact. They broadly support the presence of NATO and do not view the American and European troops as an occupying force.
[snip]
Moreover, the United States, Britain and their NATO allies have overlooked the main source for the long-lasting problems in Afghanistan — they have underestimated foreign support for the insurgents. The Taliban and their allies enjoy three advantages that help sustain their guerrilla operations: Their Pakistan bases can’t be targeted by coalition forces, they have access to logistical and armament supplies, and they have nearly unlimited recruitment sources in the madrassas of Pakistan.
It is not difficult to turn a religious student into a religious fighter, capable of using light weapons. It takes only a few weeks and does not require special instructors. Handling improvised explosive devices and preparing for suicide attacks, however, does require extensive training. In Pakistan, Al Qaeda runs secret workshops to instruct more advanced recruits in how to use explosives with remote controls.
Since it is difficult to attack the Taliban leadership or their training camps and terrorist workshops inside Pakistan, NATO aims at targeting low- level guerrillas in Afghanistan, which has only a limited impact on the guerrillas’ long-term fighting capacity.
The Taliban and their foreign allies understand that the West cannot commit its forces indefinitely because Western public support will only diminish. The Taliban know that once NATO forces leave the country, they can easily overwhelm the Afghan Army, if it remains in its current, weakened state. Because of this, many Afghans who support the Kabul government in principle are afraid to do so openly, knowing that they might have to switch allegiance at a moment’s notice in order to survive.
[snip]
Taliban guerrillas would lose some of their motivation if they were to face an Afghan Army rather than NATO forces. Moreover, fighters sitting on the ideological fence might be convinced to join the Afghan Army if they thought it more likely to win — and if the pay were better. Afghan soldiers earn about $70 a month, less than of what Taliban fighters get. Compare that to the $4,000 it costs NATO daily to keep one soldier in Afghanistan.
If the West is willing to make the investment, a secular, well-equipped Afghan National Army, based on the Turkish model, might be molded into becoming the guardian of democracy in this volatile region of the world.
Read the whole article here.






















