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The Success in Al Anbar

by
Larry C Johnson

The success achieved in Al Anbar has nothing to do with the surge and everything to do with finally tapping into genuine experts who know and understand Iraq. One of these is Pat Lang. In today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus reports:

Fourteen months ago, a 300-page Defense Department-sponsored research paper titled “Iraq Tribal Study: Al-Anbar Governorate” was completed and delivered to the Pentagon. That report — put together by a distinguished group of retired military counterinsurgency specialists and academics, each with Iraq experience — was circulated in the Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., at the time led by then-Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, now the top U.S. commander in Iraq. The study proposed changing how the United States interacts with Sunni tribal leaders, eventually contributing to winning their support in fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq forces.

Walter’s editors would not let him identify the experts. The study (actually it is a book) is titled,

    Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate:
    The Albu Fahd Tribe, The Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe

Here are the key participants:

Study Director and Primary Researcher:

Lin Todd
Contributing Researchers:
W. Patrick Lang, Jr., Colonel, US Army (Retired)
R. Alan King
Andrea V. Jackson
Montgomery McFate, PhD
Ahmed S. Hashim, PhD
Jeremy S. Harrington
Research and Writing Completed: June 18, 2006
Study Conducted Under Contract with the Department of Defense.

You can get a feel for the book by looking at the Table of Contents:

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER ONE. Introduction 1-1

CHAPTER TWO. Common Historical Characteristics and Aspects
of the Tribes of Iraq and al-Anbar Governorate 2-1
• Key Characteristics of Sunni Arab Identity 2-3
• Arab Ethnicity 2-3
– The Impact of the Arabic Language 2-4
– Arabism 2-5
– Authority in Contemporary Iraq 2-8
• Islam 2-9
– Islam and the State 2-9
– Role of Islam in Politics 2-10
– Islam and Legitimacy 2-11
– Sunni Islam 2-12
– Sunni Islam Madhabs (Schools of Law) 2-13
– Hanafi School 2-13
– Maliki School 2-14
– Shafii School 2-15
– Hanbali School 2-15
– Sunni Islam in Iraq 2-16
– Extremist Forms of Sunni Islam 2-17
– Wahhabism 2-17
– Salafism 2-19
– Takfirism 2-22
– Sunni and Shia Differences 2-23
– Islam and Arabism 2-24
– Role of Islam in Government and Politics in Iraq 2-25
– Women in Islam 2-26
– Piety 2-29
– Fatalism 2-31
– Social Justice 2-31
– Quranic Treatment of Warfare vs. Actual Practice 2-32
– Islam and Tribalism 2-33
• Tribalism and the Bedouin Tribal Ideal 2-36
– Role of Tribes in Society 2-38
– Collectivism 2-39
– Honor and Shame 2-39
– Tribal Structure and Organization 2-41
– Tribes and the Iraqi State 2-44
– Urban vs. Rural Culture 2-44
– Cultural Style of Warfare 2-46
– Greetings, Hospitality, and Privacy 2-47
– Negotiation 2-48
– Conflict Resolution 2-48

CHAPTER THREE. History of Tribes in Iraq 3-1
• General Pattern of Tribalism in Iraq 3-2
• Brief Chronology of the Wars of Conquest of Iraq 3-4
• Ancient Iraq 3-8
• The Arab Conquest 3-9
• Abbasid Caliphate: 750 - 1258 3-11
• The Mongol Invasion: 1258 3-12
• Iraq Under Ottoman Rule: 1534 - 1918 3-13
• WWI and British Mandate: 1914 - 1932 3-19
• The Monarchy: 1932 - 1958 3-22
• The Iraqi Republic: 1958 – 1968 3-26
• The 1968 Baathist Coup - 1980 3-27
• The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War: 1980 – 1993 3-30
• UN Sanctions and the Demise of the Baath Party: 1993 - 2003 3-38
• The End of the Saddam Era 3-40

CHAPTER FOUR. The Tribes of al-Anbar Governorate 4-1
• Post-Baath Sunni Arab Behavior 4-2
• Sunni Arab Tribal Interests 4-3
• Al-Anbar Governorate 4-4
• The Three Target Tribes: Albu Fahd, Albu Mahal, and Albu Issa 4-5
• The Dulaym Tribal Confederation 4-5
• The Albu Fahd Tribe 4-10
– Ancient History Through 20th Century 4-10
– Territorial Issues 4-11
– Lineage, Linkages, and Alliances 4-11
– Key Traits and Cultural Narratives 4-16
– Actions During Previous Crisis Periods 4-16
– Religion 4-17
– Economic Issues 4-17
– Influential Leaders 4-18
– General Background Since March 2003 4-18
– Participation in Insurgency / Relations with Insurgent Groups 4-19
– Relations with Coalition 4-20
• The Albu Mahal Tribe 4-27
– Ancient History Through 20th Century 4-27
– Territorial Issues 4-27
– Lineage, Linkages, and Alliances 4-28
– Key Traits and Cultural Narratives 4-30
– Actions During Previous Crisis Periods 4-30
– Religion 4-31
– Economic Issues 4-31
– Influential Leaders 4-31
– General Background Since March 2003 4-32
– Participation in Insurgency / Relations with Insurgent Groups 4-32
– Relations with Coalition 4-33
• The Albu Issa Tribe 4-36
– Ancient History Through 20th Century 4-36
– Territorial Issues 4-37
– Lineage, Linkages, and Alliances 4-37
– Key Traits and Cultural Narratives 4-40
– Actions During Previous Crisis Periods 4-40
– Religion 4-41
– Economic Issues 4-41
– Influential Leaders 4-42
– General Background Since March 2003 4-42
– Participation in Insurgency / Relations with Insurgent Groups 4-42
– Relations with Coalition 4-43

CHAPTER FIVE. Tribal Influence – Historical Analysis 5-1
• The Ottoman Experience with the Tribes in Iraq 5-2
• The British Experience with the Tribes in Iraq 5-11
• Counter Insurgency in Oman: The Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1975 5-31
• Strife in Yemen: British Counter Insurgency Opns in Aden, 1955-1967 5-36
• Tribal Warfare in Saudi Arabia: Ibn Saud’s Consolidation
of Power, 1902-1924 5-39
• Saddam Period in Iraq 5-42

CHAPTER SIX. Analytic and Operational Tools
in Counter Insurgency 6-1
• An Overview of Insurgency 6-1
– Definitions of and Approaches to Analyzing Insurgency 6-2
– Terrorism Versus Insurgency 6-6
– The Nature of Insurgency 6-7
– Elements Common to all Insurgencies 6-9
– The Principles of Insurgent Warfare 6-16
– Insurgency in the Middle East 6-18
• Government Response: An Overview of Counter Insurgency 6-19
– The Evolution of Counter Insurgency Strategy 6-20
– The Three Types of Counter Insurgency Strategies/Responses 2-22
– Principles of “Hearts and Minds” Counter Insurgency Strategy 6-24
• The Need for Operational Tools in Counter Insurgency 6-34
• “The Object Beyond War”: Counter Insurgency and
the Four Tools of Political Competition 6-34
– Coercive Force 6-36
– Ideology 6-42
– Economic Incentive and Disincentive 6-45
– Traditional Authority 6-48

CHAPTER SEVEN – A. Emerging Insights on
Influencing the Tribes of al-Anbar 7A-1
• Implement as Part of an Integrated Strategy 7A-3
• Ensure an In-Depth Understanding of Iraqi and Tribal Culture 7A-4
• Identify Tribes and Tribal Interests 7A-7
• Leverage Traditional Authority 7A-8
• Use a Compelling Ideology 7A-12
• Use Appropriate Coercive Force 7A-16
• Use Economic Incentives and Disincentives 7A-18
• Explore the Use of Non-Iraqi Tribal Intermediaries 7A-19
• Understand Insurgent Use of Tribes 7A-19
• Avoid key pitfalls in Dealing with Tribes 7A-20
• Learn from Previous Coalition Efforts to Influence Iraqi Tribes 7A-22

CHAPTER SEVEN – B. Example Application:
Influencing the Three Target Tribes 7B-1
• How to Persuade the Tribes to Stop Supporting Insurgency 7B-1
• How to Persuade the Tribes to Support the Coalition 7B-2
• Albu Fahd 7B-2
• Albu Mahal 7B-8
• Albu Issa 7B-14
• Observations on the Impact of the Death of Zarqawi 7B-19
Appendices.
Appendix 1. How to Work and Live with Tribesmen
Appendix 2. An Operational View of Islam
Appendix 3. HUMINT in Counter Insurgency
Tribal Map of Iraq
Bibliography.

If the Department of Defense had done studies like this sooner there would be fewer dead Iraqis and Americans. As I have noted in previous blog entries, solving the immediate problem in Al Anbar does not ensure reconciliation with the Shia led government. These tribes are not friends of the Shia and do not see themselves as part of the national Iraqi government. But, at least we have a grassroots solution being put into place and the effective disengagement of U.S. troops killing Iraqis in Al Anbar. That is a step in the right direction.

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RSS Feed for This Post17 Comments »

Comment by zennurse | 2007-08-28 01:54:34

Thanks for this Larry, and thanks to Pat and his colleagues. As I see Valerie Wilson’s book avail for preorder, I wonder what she would be contributing now to a discussion of the middle east, assuming it would have been a different issue without the war but one we would still need to address. Such a loss.

 

Comment by SusanUnPC | 2007-08-28 02:03:41

I’m proud of Pat, and so pleased that they took advantage of his great expertise and pragmatic view of the world.

Thanks for letting us know, Larry.

 

Comment by No Blood for Hubris | 2007-08-28 03:51:22

Well, well. Someone’s actually listening to the elitist eggheads?

That could be the start of a slide down a slippery slope.

There was a time in America where expertise and intelligence were qualities that were celebrated , rather than ridiculed. (Nostalgic sigh).

Too bad we’ve had so many stupids at the helm for so very long.

 

Comment by Shirin | 2007-08-28 05:26:09

Not to put a wet blanket on things, but insurgents (sic) in Al Anbar and other parts of Iraq have been fighting them to one degree or another for years, simply because they don’t like them coming in and trying to impose their will any more than they like the Americans doing it.

 

Comment by Shirin | 2007-08-28 05:39:44

PS It’s nice to have all that academic information, I suppose, but simply understanding that Iraqis are, at the core of things, simply human beings who, like all other human beings dislike being bombed, having their houses broken into at 3 A.M. by heavily armed strangers who drag them out of bed, manhandle them, and trash their houses, having their loved ones killed, or hauled away and tortured, and in general being treated like crap, would have been a lot simpler and faster.

It’s just amazing how people all over the world are more alike than they are different.

Comment by lidia | 2007-08-28 17:24:41

exactly. I just have seen “Wind shaking barley” and was astonished how Brits in Irland were the same as in Iraq now (or as Zionists in Palestina) and the same is right about Irish people and Iraqis (or Palestinians). Of course Loach did this with a thought about modern times, but still he is quite accurate with historical facts. By the way, Brits were as well “persuading” Irish to support their rule.

Comment by wethornet | 2007-12-05 10:30:44

lidia, help. pls. flesh out the “wind shaking barley” reference. movie, documentary, tv??? who is loach?

i’m curious about this. thx.

wethornet, whose grandmother was from ireland.

 
 
 

Comment by mudkitty | 2007-08-28 12:39:15

What makes you think we don’t know this?

 

Comment by Rob | 2007-08-28 14:00:00

eh… love the new style blog hate the way it appears when one of you ‘formats paragraphs as quotes”, the print come onto my lap very light and difficult to read. Can you brighten this just a little…please?

By the way, unfortunately its too late in the Iraq game even for the experts….just too late…

 

Comment by Rob | 2007-08-28 14:10:12

PS:

Why has this unclassed study not been released to the public yet?

 

Comment by Rob | 2007-08-28 14:13:24

PSS:……eh… DoH!

Iran Prepared to Fill Iraq Power Vacuum
Aug 28 10:07 AM US/Eastern
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI

Associated Press Writer
TEHRAN, Iran (AP) - President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad warned Tuesday that a power vacuum is imminent in Iraq and said that Iran was ready to help fill the gap.

“The political power of the occupiers is collapsing rapidly,” Ahmadinejad said at a press conference in Tehran, referring to U.S. troops in Iraq. “Soon, we will see a huge power vacuum in the region. Of course, we are prepared to fill the gap, with the help of neighbors and regional friends like Saudi Arabia, and with the help of the Iraqi nation.”

Copyright 2007 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

 

Comment by Leslie | 2007-08-28 15:58:46

The Bushies: Always an hour late and a dollar short, assuming they listen at all.

At least someone is listening though!

 

Comment by katyfitz | 2007-08-28 17:20:57

Would very much like to read this report/book. Seems as though it would be helpful to all of us.

 

Comment by bob h | 2007-08-31 11:27:02

That Al Qaeda would lose traction in places like Anbar is hardly surprising, because the Iraqis are secular Arabs to whom austere Wahabism is foreign. Which is the very point why the war was misguided to begin with.

 

Pingback by ANNOUNCING a new novel by a writer we admire (+ Open Thread) : NO QUARTER | 2007-12-04 16:10:48

[...] Iraq. One of these is Pat Lang. In today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus reports: … (READ ALL of Larry’s post, “The Success in Al [...]

 

Comment by Charles Cameron (hipbone) | 2007-12-04 19:16:20

I suspect that Col. Lang’s “How to Work with Tribesmen” corresponds to a great extent with the material in the book — you can find it as a .pdf on his site here

 

Pingback by What McCain, Obama and Clinton Need to Know About the Surge : NO QUARTER | 2008-02-07 20:33:17

[...] of Iraqi society.  Pat Lang, a retired U.S. Army Colonel and Middle East expert, produced a study in early 2006 that is the true source of the shift in tactics that has helped reduce the violence in Iraq.  [...]

 

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