MEMO #3 to Superdelegates: Obama’s Coalition Is A Losing Coalition

Jay Cost of Real Clear Politics published a series of graphs on 23 MAY that underscore the weaknesses of Barack Obama’s coalition. These graphs elucidate what we already know: Obama will lose the popular vote to John McCain in a general election; Obama is unpopular with core constituencies of the Democratic Party; and Obama will lose the electoral college to John McCain. Let us discuss Cost’s graphs, as the data they present should alarm those charged with shaping and determining the destiny of the Democratic Party.

According to this graph, Clinton has the support of voters in regions of the country Democrats traditionally win: she is more popular than Obama in New England; she trounced Obama in the Middle Atlantic states, some of which are swing states; and she edges him in the south central region, or Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee and Kentucky, a region of the country Bill Clinton carried in 1992 and 1996. She is the candidate who has proven that she can mobilize the voters we need to deliver to the polls in November if we are to win the general election. Obama, on the other hand, cannot.

But notice where Obama is popular: the south Atlantic, which Democrats never carry during a general election; and the north central area of the country, which one can attribute to his victory in Illinois and to his ability to win caucuses in Iowa and Minnesota. Here is not the place to address the problems Obama’s caucus victories pose to Democrats in November. What is relevant, however, is the location in which Obama’s strength in primaries lies: the deep South. While he can mobilize African-American voters in this area of the country, this will not guarantee victories in Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina or Mississippi. Clinton, however, can win with her coalition of working class and rural Caucasian voters in states such as Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky and West Virginia. The following graph illustrates this point:

Obama’s inability to gain the support of Caucasian voters south of the Mason-Dixon line makes it impossible for him to carry any of those states. Clinton, however, can win some of those states with her coalition of working class Caucasian voters and women in the upper south.

Once again Clinton’s strengths are in traditionally Democratic strongholds, particularly the Pacific West. Her primary victories in Oklahoma and Texas also reveal she is the Democrat who can cobble together a competitive coalition of working class Caucasians, Latinos and Native Americans in those states. Contrast this with Obama’s strengths, which once again are in Republican areas of the country: the Upper Midwest and the Mountain West. His advantage in the Upper Midwest is largely a result of his caucus victories in states such as Kansas, Nebraska and North Dakota. But unfortunately for Obama, the general election is not a caucus.

Also notice how his lead in the Mountain West is narrow. This is a result of Clinton’s victories in New Mexico, Nevada and Arizona, states with demographics that clearly favor Clinton over Obama. Many claim that Obama is the candidate who will render the Mountain West competitive. But how does one square this with the small percentage of votes separating the two candidates in this region? And how does one ignore Clinton’s ability to win both caucuses and primaries in New Mexico, Arizona and Nevada. Some may claim Clinton is not as competitive as Obama in the Mountain West, but this is not supported by the election returns and by the data presented in this graph, which reveals that both candidates are capable of building the coalitions required to render some states in this region competitive. And notice I write competitive, for none of these states are guaranteed to Democrats in the general election. This undermines one of the main arguments Obama supporters propound when they argue for his electability.

This graph also militates against those who argue for Obama’s electability, particularly those who cite the number of states he has won. For many of those states are caucus states, not primary states, and the general election is an open primary, not a closed caucus. Yes, the candidates are virtually tied in their totals for primaries, but Obama’s margin is largely a result of the margins of victory he earned in the south Atlantic states, states he has no chance of winning in November with his largely African-American coalition. Clinton’s victories, on the other hand, are in states she can win with her coalition of working and middle class Caucasians and Latinos. Also notice how they are essentially tied in the overall total. This, of course, will change after Clinton wins Puerto Rico. South Dakota and Montana may also surprise us, as these states will hold primaries and not caucuses.

Obama’s strengths in antidemocratic caucuses should raise the eyebrows of the superdelegates. Caucus victories do not necessarily translate into victories during a general election scenario wherein almost everyone has equal access to the ballot. If Obama touts these victories as evidence of his electability, the central premise of his candidacy is undermined.

The electoral problems with Obama’s reliance on caucus victories is illustrated in this graph, which reveals how Hillary’s delegates represent more actual voters than those of Obama. Obama’s delegates are largely the result of small caucus victories, while Clinton’s delegates were earned in primaries with record turnouts. How can Obama possibly translate delegates who represent a small segment of the population into a coalition that can catapult him to victory in a general election? Clinton can, for her delegates represent record turnouts in states such as West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Arkansas, all of which are states we must win in November. Those who are truly interested in “the math” will take the data explicated in this graph very seriously, for it reveals that Obama’s coalition is indeed smaller, weaker and less reliable than that of Hillary Clinton.

And not only is that coalition smaller; it is not representative of the core constituencies that comprise the Democratic Party. Obama’s coalition is comprised of 38% African-Americans, 27% affluent Caucasians and 7% young whites. In other words, his victories are largely the result of large African-American turnout in the South and the turnout of voters in urban centers. That turnout, however, will not guarantee a general election victory in south Atlantic states or in more rural areas of the country. Moreover, the large number of younger voters his campaign touts has not made a significant contribution to his coalition. If they do not alter the composition his coalition, how will these younger voters impact the general election? And how will he win a general election if the remainder of his coalition is comprised of coastal and urban elites localized in six or seven states? That support will not translate into electoral votes in Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio or West Virginia, all of which are states we must win in November.

Jay Cost’s graphs outline what we already know: Obama’s coalition is a weak coalition resembling that of McGovern or Dukakis. And these are not winning coalitions. In fact, they are losing coalitions. If the Democratic Party desires to win in November, superdelegates will cast their votes for Clinton, for they now know that Obama’s coalition of “eggheads” and African-Americans is one that has a documented history of losing. Contrast this with Hillary’s coalition of working and middle class Caucasians and Latinos, a coalition that can form the foundation onto which we can build the electoral margins we will need in key states in order to defeat John McCain in November.

The graphs offer a very simple and didactic lesson to superdelegates: a vote for Clinton is a vote for building a home with an approved plan on a very stable Democratic foundation; a vote for Obama is a vote for balancing a dilapidated structure on three very weak cement blocks. Let us hope the superdelegates will vote in our Party’s best interest. Our Democratic big tent relies on it.