Afghanistan is Not Pashto for Vietnam

Although I compared Obama’s treatment of Afghanistan’s President Karzai today with that meted out to Vietnam’s Diem back in the early sixties, I do not mean to suggest that Afghanistan is just another misadventure like Vietnam. That is utter nonsense.

Here is Theodore Sorenson’s misreading of the current situation.

America’s unwise, unwarranted, and sadly unwinnable war in Afghanistan—hastily initiated and then abandoned for Iraq by President Barack Obama’s ideologically blinded predecessor and dumped into Obama’s lap in the worst possible way—is beginning increasingly to smell like the 1964-68 war in South Vietnam that swallowed up the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson.

It all sounds familiar. A powerless leader (whether Vietnam’s Diem or Afghanistan’s Karzai) with a corrupt family and little support in the countryside, who refuses to undertake the reforms (land, tax, electoral, and administrative) that the U.S. president tries to press upon him, therefore endangering the regime’s stability against the guerrilla extremists (once communists, now Taliban). Repeatedly changing U.S. commanders and initiating open-ended increases in U.S. forces, without a clearly definable goal, does not help. A military strategy of “clear and hold” usually lasts about a day.

Ted forgot an important point–CLUELESS POLITICIANS IGNORING THEIR MILITARY COMMANDERS AND TRYING TO SECOND GUESS THEM FROM THE COMFORT OF THE WEST WING.

He closes his piece with this nonsense:

Even the rhetoric today is familiar—the dire warnings that an American loss would embolden our enemies and lead to a “domino effect” chain of setbacks across the region; that we must keep on sending fresh troops to kill or be killed, thereby expanding both America’s mission and stakes, even though Obama had no more initiated America’s role in Afghanistan than Kennedy initiated America’s role in South Vietnam. There was little the U.S. could do to stop the flow of arms and enemy combatants into South Vietnam across its porous border with North Vietnam, just as there is little the U.S. can do now to stem the flow of arms and enemy combatants pouring across Afghanistan’s porous border with Pakistan.

How clueless can someone be? Ted Sorenson. Ahh, but I repeat myself.

Okay Ted, let me take a shot. We are not imagining nuclear weapons in Pakistan. We are not imagining that senior elements of Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI) helped organize and fund Al Qaeda and at least two other Islamic terrorist organizations (e.g., Harakat Ul Mujahedin and Lashkar Taeiba). The Taliban have received funds and protection from government officials in Pakistan. In fact, former Pakistani President Musharref interceded with George Bush to let Taliban leaders flee Afghanistan in December 2001 just as CIA and US military operatives were closing the noose on Bin Laden at Tora Bora.

Aghanistan/Pakistan terrorist nexus has been the cesspool, the fountain fueling most of the terror over the last 12 years. In my infamous op-ed in the NY Times in July 2001 I made the following point:

The most violent and least reported source of international terrorism is the undeclared war between Islamists and Hindus over the disputed Kashmir region of India, bordering Pakistan. Although India came in second in terms of the number of terrorist incidents in 2000, with 63, it accounted for almost 50 percent of all resulting deaths, with 187 killed, and injuries, with 337 hurt. Most of the blame lies with radical groups trained in Afghanistan and operating from Pakistan.

The Islamic extremism emanating from Pakistan and being given safehaven in Afghanistan is the major source of terrorism and is a threat to not only our security but the security of countries throughout South Asia.

Think I am exaggerating? Then answer this question–what happens if the Taliban get their hands on a Pakistani nuke? Do we do anything?

We are not fighting a nationalist Vietnamese movement fueled by communist ideology. We are up against a fractious religious fanaticism that is not invincible. General McChrystal understands this basic point. Read what he wrote.

It is laughable to insist that we have been “at war” for 8 years in Afghanistan. Nonsense. George W. Bush shifted significant military resources away from Afghanistan starting the end of November 2001. We have had no significant, sustained troop commitment. Bush and company treated Afghanistan like a “red-headed” step child. We have never had an integrated strategy and the chain of command has been muddled–NATO doing its thing, CENTCON another and Special Ops forces pursuing terrorists. Just because we send soldiers to a country and disperse them widely in poorly defended forward operating bases we should not jump to the conclusion that this is “war.”

Second, read McChrystal’s assessment. McChrystal is not calling for a conventional military force nor is he advocating “attacking” armies in Afghanistan. Instead he’s calling for enough troops to protect those villages/cities that are not under the sway of the radical religious nuts. He also recognizes, correctly, that the enemy in Afghanistan is not monolithic and is completely and totally enabled by the religious extremists in Pakistan. More importantly, he specifically recognizes that we cannot win a military victory–that diplomatic and political deals are necessary.

Afghanistan is where we should have been focused 8 years ago. I was “fired” from Fox News for making the case that Iraq would be a distraction in the war on terror. Instead of nabbing Bin Laden and helping Pakistan break its ties to the Taliban, we have let the situation fester and the radical Islamists bent on setting the world on fire are making a come back. The initial blame for this mess belongs to George Bush. But Bush ain’t President now and Barack Obama is sending nothing but a message of vacillation and weakness to the world. If we do not stop the spread of the Taliban or contain them we will be looking at worse than what happened on 9-11. That’s why I don’t think the McChrystal strategy is out of line. We risk far more if we ignore it.