FBI Interrogator’s Blockbuster Testimony on Torture [VIDEO UPDATE]
By SusanUnPC on May 13, 2009 at 10:36 PM in Current Affairs, Torture
Ali Soufan, a former FBI agent who actually interrogated a terrorist and did not hear about it from someone who watched a lame episode of “24,” confronted the U.S. Senate today and upheld the rule of law rather than the rule of brute force. Here is a critical passage from Soufan’s prepared testimony followed by a NEW video via CNN that focuses directly on Soufan:
These techniques [enhanced interrogation], from an operational perspective, are ineffective, slow and unreliable, and as a result harmful to our efforts to defeat al Qaeda. (This is aside from the important additional considerations that they are un-American and harmful to our reputation and cause.)
How critical was Soufan’s testimony today — particularly about Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation? Writes Mark Benjamin for Salon:
The testimony of a key witness at a Senate hearing Wednesday raised serious questions about the truthfulness of former President George W. Bush’s own personal defense of the CIA’s brutal interrogation program. Former FBI agent Ali Soufan also indicated that the harsh interrogation techniques may actually have hindered the collection of intelligence, causing a high-value prisoner to stop cooperating.
An Atlanta Journal Constitution reporter/blogger hit the nail on the head with the title of his post on Soufan’s testimony: “It ain’t “24.” it ain’t Jack Bauer. It’s just real.“
First, here’s the MSNBC report on Soufan’s testimony:
Visit msnbc.com for Breaking News, World News, and News about the Economy
Now, here is the AJC blog report, “It ain’t “24.” it ain’t Jack Bauer. It’s just real.“
Ali Soufan, a former FBI investigator and interrogator who at one point in his career went undercover as an al Qaida operative, testifies to the Senate Judiciary Committee today from behind a screen, where he cannot be seen or photographed.
The subject is torture.
In his prepared testimony, Soufan lays out an impressive list of accomplishments:
“In my capacity as a FBI Agent, I investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the events surrounding the attacks of 9/11. I also coordinated both domestic and international counter-terrorism operations on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office.
I personally interrogated many terrorists we have in our custody and elsewhere, and gained confessions, identified terror operatives, their funding, details of potential plots, and information on how al Qaeda operates, along with other actionable intelligence. Because of these successes, I was the government’s main witness in both of the trials we have had so far in Guantanamo Bay – the trial of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a driver and bodyguard for Osama Bin Laden, and Ali Hamza Al Bahlul, Bin Laden’s propagandist. In addition I am currently helping the prosecution prepare for upcoming trials of other detainees held in Guantanamo Bay.”
More importantly, Soufan led the initial interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, al Qaida’s “fixer.” In his prepared remarks, he describes what he was able to achieve, what information he was able to draw from Zubaydah very quickly, and what happened when high-level officials in Washington — officials untrained and inexperienced in interrogation — overrode Soufan’s recommendations and insisted that more brutal methods, up to and including waterboarding, be applied to Zubaydah.
“The new techniques did not produce results as Abu Zubaydah shut down and stopped talking. At that time nudity and low-level sleep deprivation (between 24 and 48 hours) was being used. After a few days of getting no information, and after repeated inquiries from DC asking why all of sudden no information was being transmitted (when before there had been a steady stream), we again were given control of the interrogation.
We then returned to using the Informed Interrogation Approach. Within a few hours, Abu Zubaydah again started talking and gave us important actionable intelligence.
This included the details of Jose Padilla, the so-called “dirty bomber.” To remind you of how important this information was viewed at the time, the then-Attorney General, John Ashcroft, held a press conference from Moscow to discuss the news. Other important actionable intelligence was also gained that remains classified.
After a few days, the contractor attempted to once again try his untested theory and he started to re-implementing the harsh techniques. He moved this time further along the force continuum, introducing loud noise and then temperature manipulation.
Throughout this time, my fellow FBI agent and I, along with a top CIA interrogator who was working with us, protested, but we were overruled. I should also note that another colleague, an operational psychologist for the CIA, had left the location because he objected to what was being done.
Again, however, the technique wasn’t working and Abu Zubaydah wasn’t revealing any information, so we were once again brought back in to interrogate him. We found it harder to reengage him this time, because of how the techniques had affected him, but eventually, we succeeded, and he re-engaged again.
Once again the contractor insisted on stepping up the notches of his experiment, and this time he requested the authorization to place Abu Zubaydah in a confinement box, as the next stage in the force continuum. While everything I saw to this point were nowhere near the severity later listed in the memos, the evolution of the contractor’s theory, along with what I had seen till then, struck me as “borderline torture.”
As the Department of Justice IG report released last year states, I protested to my superiors in the FBI and refused to be a part of what was happening. The Director of the FBI, Robert Mueller, a man I deeply respect, agreed passing the message that “we don’t do that,” and I was pulled out.
As you can see from this timeline, many of the claims made in the memos about the success of the enhanced techniques are inaccurate. For example, it is untrue to claim Abu Zubaydah wasn’t cooperating before August 1, 2002. The truth is that we got actionable intelligence from him in the first hour of interrogating him.
In addition, simply by putting together dates cited in the memos with claims made, falsehoods are obvious. For example, it has been claimed that waterboarding got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Jose Padilla. But that doesn’t add up: Waterboarding wasn’t approved until 1 August 2002 (verbally it was authorized around mid July 2002), and Padilla was arrested in May 2002.
The same goes for KSM’s involvement in 9/11: That was discovered in April 2002, while waterboarding was not introduced until almost three months later. It speaks volumes that the quoted instances of harsh interrogation methods being a success are false.”
Every American interested in the question of torture should read Soufan’s testimony. This is not the macho bluster of a talk show host, or the tortuous rhetoric of an unethical lawyer trying to make the law say something it does not. It is not the self-justifying preening of a former vice president. This is a somber, first-hand, eyewitness account by a man who put his life on the line for his country, a man who knows his business, and a man who was deeply offended as a professional and as an American by what took place. Here is how he closes his remarks:
“In summary, the Informed Interrogation Approach outlined in the Army Field Manual is the most effective, reliable, and speedy approach we have for interrogating terrorists. It is legal and has worked time and again.
It was a mistake to abandon it in favor of harsh interrogation methods that are harmful, shameful, slower, unreliable, ineffective, and play directly into the enemy’s handbook. It was a mistake to abandon an approach that was working and naively replace it with an untested method. It was a mistake to abandon an approach that is based on the cumulative wisdom and successful tradition of our military, intelligence, and law enforcement community, in favor of techniques advocated by contractors with no relevant experience.
The mistake was so costly precisely because the situation was, and remains, too risky to allow someone to experiment with amateurish, Hollywood style interrogation methods- that in reality- taints sources, risks outcomes, ignores the end game, and diminishes our moral high ground in a battle that is impossible to win without first capturing the hearts and minds around the world. It was one of the worst and most harmful decisions made in our efforts against al Qaeda.
For the last seven years, it was not easy objecting to these methods when they had powerful backers. I stood up then for the same reason I’m willing to take on critics now, because I took an oath swearing to protect this great nation. I could not stand by quietly while our country’s safety was endangered and our moral standing damaged.”
Go read it. It ain’t “24;” it ain’t Jack Bauer. This is real life.
You can read Soufan’s full statement to the Senate panel: “Statement Of FBI Agent Ali Soufan At Torture Hearings.”
And be sure to check Larry Johnson’s posts — several of them — that refer to Soufan’s critically important op-ed in the New York Times.
Here’s another video, via Al Jazeera, on today’s testimony:






















