Larry Johnson on CNN, 4 pm ET [Updated]

UPDATE: The transcript is now available, immediately below the fold, followed by the Sunday night interview.

Special thanks to C.S. for rushing this video into production!

Here is the transcript of the above video, via CNN’s transcripts. From CNN Tonight, 12/28/09:

ROBERTS: The failed attack on Flight 253 raises critical questions about airport and America’s ability to keep an eye on terrorists. Joining me now is Larry Johnson. He is the CEO and co- founder of Berg Associates. It’s an international consulting firm. He’s a former deputy director of the state’s department counter terrorism office.

Larry, great to see you. This all raises a question. Eight years after 9/11, how much better are we at screening people who go aboard aircraft?

LARRY JOHNSON, CEO, BERG ASSOCIATES: We’re better than before 9/11, but let put it in the right context. This is 15 years after al- Qaeda made its first effort successful to put a bomb on the plane, that was Ramzi Yousef, the bomber of the first World Trade Center in1993.

In December of ’94, he took components on board a Philippine Airline flight, built it in the bathroom, placed it under a seat, got off at the next stop, plane took off and blew up in midair. So we’ve known about this threat for 15 years and it’s stunning that despite knowing that even to this day there is no effective technological solution in place at the airports for passenger screening in terms what have a passenger takes on board a plane and for carry-on luggage that would prevent a bomb. That’s sad reality.

ROBERTS: So you’re saying that there’s nothing in the existing system that could have prevented this fellow from bringing this on board?

JOHNSON: Nothing that’s required and in place. There are a variety of systems, two basic types. One called trace detector, basically think of a dog’s nose. It sniffs out elements left over. The problem with the trace detector, though, is that someone who is skilled can package it in such a way that you will not pick up the trace elements of the explosive.

The other one is a bulk detector, something like the CT scan used right now for checked baggage. That has a little bit better success and there’s still some limitations there. The point is that since 9/11, we have put this place professionals it at the security check points, that’s a good thing. They have required to x-ray and submit and look for explosives in checked baggage. But if the passenger boarding spots, that’s still a massive vulnerability and there’s no quick fix to it.

ROBERTS: Let’s look at the progression of airport security. After 9/11, you cooperate take on board any sharp objects for fear that hijackers might take over the crews as they did at 9/11. Then Richard Reed comes along, you have to take off your shoes. And then these people come along trying to get liquid explosives on aircraft. Now you’re limited to amount of explosives. Goodness know what is eventually will come out of this latest attack. It always seems like we’re preparing for the last attack as opposed to the next one. Are we simply playing catch-up here or are we simply react something.

JOHNSON: We’re not even playing catch-up. I disagree with you in the sense, I go back to the Pan Am 103 bombing when I first started at the U.S. State Department in the counterterrorism office. It took us from 1988 until 2001 to start putting in place requirements to screen checked baggage for explosives.

That was over 13 years. And now we’ve had since 1994 where we know a person, an al-Qaeda operative, brought a bomb on board and we still have not put in place the technologies at those check points that can prevent it. I don’t even not sure we’re reacting. This is not waiting until the horse escapes the barn. We wait until the horse escapes, the barn is burnt to the ground and then we run around saying quick, somebody, capture the horse.

ROBERTS: Earlier today you were talking about the idea of the U.S. government need sing some sort of Manhattan project style of program to come up with new technology at the airport. You can detail some of that for us?

JOHNSON: There’s been a little bit of that effort at FAA, but there has not been — you’ve not marshaled the resources of all the national laboratories. We have an enormous network of national laboratories across this country initially in place to build nuclear weapons and prepare to deal with the Soviet threat.

That threat’s gone away. These national labs have been looking for a mission in life. The one thing that no president has done, not President Clinton, not President Bush or not President Obama yet, have marshaled those national laboratories and say let put a Manhattan project together to develop viable technology that will detect explosives that people can hide on bodies. The good news we face is that foreign lit al-Qaeda guys are fairly incompetent at this.

ROBERTS: All right, Larry Johnson, thanks so much.

NOW, here is the transcript from Larry’s telephonic interview on Sunday night (12/27/09; 22:00 hour), “CNN NEWSROOM“:

Larry Johnson is former deputy director of the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism. He joins us by phone now to explain more about what these lists mean and what they are supposed to accomplish.

Mr. Johnson, thank you for joining us.

LARRY JOHNSON, FMR. DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COUNTERTERRORISM: Yes, good evening.

GRIFFIN: And the question right out of the gate is, this guy’s on a terror watch list of some kind. What, if anything, does that really mean?

JOHNSON: Let me correct one thing that you said. The TIDE database is maintained by the National Counterterrorism Center under the control of the director of national intelligence.

The Terrorist Screening Center, TSC, which has the terrorist screening database, the TSDB — remember, if you’re in government, you can’t talk unless you use acronyms. That TSDB is under the control of the FBI. So right away you’ve got two different government agencies. And the NCTC list where this Umar was, that’s sort of like fly paper. Everything gets dumped in there, but you don’t necessarily have a systematic approach for going through the information to figure out actually what needs to come to the surface and be cycled out.

GRIFFIN: But Larry, let me just stop you there. So he’s on this list. I’m asking you what is the point of having that list if not to just raise suspicion when this guy travels?

JOHNSON: Well, the point of having the list sometimes it seems is just to have the list to say, well, see, we have a list. It is very frustrating. And Americans should be frustrated. If they could simply pull back the curtain and look at the state of what government really is.

When you recognize that this information, this is like that scene from “Raiders of the Lost Ark” where the ark of the covenant is shoved into this government warehouse that has rows and rows of boxes, disappears. That’s sort of what happens here.

The system is not the kind of thing that, you know, where people are used in the movies seeing someone sit at the computer, type in a name and it pops up the information and the picture and all the information you need. That unfortunately is not happening here. And so I think we’re still even eight years now after the 9/11 attacks, we still have not made a lot of progress at putting together a system where, you know, for example, an airline official can go in and tap into a database to find out should this person be on this flight or not.

GRIFFIN: Earlier this year, an inspector general report in fact found the terrorist screening list was a mess. Terrorists who should have been on it weren’t on it. Citizens who were on it, who shouldn’t have been on it were still stuck on it.

JOHNSON: Yes.

GRIFFIN: But that — I remember there were congressional hearings. There was a new director put in charge of it. A guy we tried to have on tonight. But, again, we’re seeing either it’s not being cleaned up or it’s not being used effectively to prevent this guy…

JOHNSON: Right.

GRIFFIN: …who should have been screened or patted down, from getting on this flight. JOHNSON: But, Drew, listen, I’ll remind you that in December of 1994, Ramzi Yousef, the bomber of the first World Trade Center, he put a bomb on board a plane in the Philippines that blew up. So we’ve known that terrorists can get bombs on board planes. Then we have no effective security system or technology in place even today that can prevent a person from bringing a bomb on board a plane secreted on their person or in a carry-on luggage. There is no system for that.

And yet 15 years later, we still have done nothing from putting in place a technology that could solve that. So, you know, I’ve seen all the congressional hand wringing. I see the administration — and this is a bipartisan failure. Let’s understand that. But the American traveling public shouldn’t be confused to think that the government actually has a handle on this because they don’t.

GRIFFIN: Janet Napolitano, Homeland security, today said that although he was on a list, it was such a low list that — and I’m not quoting here. But I’ll say it appeared there was nothing actionable that can be done.

Copout?

JOHNSON: Yes. A little bit. Plus remember, I couldn’t believe Janet Napolitano, she’s on your network earlier saying the system worked. A system that allows a guy on board a plane with an explosive? A system that requires passengers to have to be part of the security team even though they’re not trained and not paid?

I mean, that’s not a system. That’s chaos. And it’s shameful really that she would make such a silly claim. She did it. Robert Gibbs did it. We need to stop with the political spin. We need to say, look, let’s put in place a security system that actually works. And, unfortunately, we still have not done it when it comes to dealing with the issue of explosives that a person can carry onto a plane and actually build on board an airplane.

GRIFFIN: Final thought, Larry, before I have you go. And, again, a reminder that Larry Johnson, former deputy director of the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism.

What are we dealing with? Territorial feudism among different screening agencies and different security agencies within government?

JOHNSON: You know, it’s a big, big bureaucracy. I wish your listeners, your watchers could go into, for example, just look at the State Department Embassy Computer System, the Internet, there’s no standardization. Even within the State Department.

So when you start getting outside of particular agencies, you’ve run into a problem of lack of standardization. You get an enormous input of information. And yet all this information’s coming in like a fire hose filling a rain barrel, but you only have a little spigot at the other end to try to get rid of the water. We’ve got more water coming in than they can take out, and that inevitably results in confusion and blockage. GRIFFIN: Larry Johnson joining us tonight. Thank you, sir, for the information. We might add that earlier tonight the director of the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, Timothy Healy, agreed to an interview here on CNN, but shortly afterwards he backed out. Wouldn’t appear.

There are so many questions and so many layers to the Detroit terror investigation. We’re going to take you to London for an update on what investigators are finding there.