The Crisis at the Checkpoint Continues
By John H Huey on January 21, 2010 at 2:45 PM in Current Affairs
Editor’s Note: John Huey, a security professional involved with Aviation Security issues for over 28 years, has now published three articles for NoQuarter. Learn more about John Huey and his constructive critiques in his first post published at NoQuarterUSA.net on January 5, 2010: “From An Insider: The Need for Risk-Analysis, High-Threat Screening Lanes & Checkpoints.”
The Crisis at the Checkpoint Continues
In Through the Back Door: Al-Qaeda Adaptability in the Wake of Christmas Day
While the attention of the media and the world at large has been focused, quite rightly, on the unfolding tragedy in Haiti the plots to disrupt and defeat the West (in a symbolic way) using Aviation as a vector have continued to evolve.
Most recently we have heard (CNN 1-13) that US and foreign intelligence services believe that Al-Qaeda operatives from Yemen are still in play for further Christmas Day style attacks.
The focus, thus far, has been on threats emanating from Europe but it is easy to see that Al-Qaeda has the ability to migrate from country to country (Sudan to Afghanistan to Pakistan to Yemen, back to Sudan then on to Uzbekistan, Chechnya, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc, etc, etc…) while maintaining a great deal of operational capability.
Regardless of the credibility of the most recent reports it appears that our adversaries still have the trans-national abilities to operate virtually anywhere on the planet.
We may very well see Al-Qaeda going to the weaker points in the system while avoiding heightened readiness levels in Europe. This, quite conceivably, could be their next step.
In 2003 I proposed, through a federally chartered aviation security group, a pilot project to TSA to export US standard security procedures to third world countries. It was not a practical prospect at that time but it strikes me that the time might be right to re-animate such a proposal.
The purpose of the project was to determine the feasibility of exporting the current TSA procedure for hold baggage and passenger screening to a third world country with direct flights to the United States. Subsequent events have lead me to believe that the scope of the project could be enhanced to encompass an enhanced watch list/profiling regime as well as, possibly, an integrated high threat security lane once developed.
The rationale for the project is the fact that a major loophole exists in the current system whereby new security equipment, personnel and procedures are in place for domestic flights as well as international flights originating domestically without, in many cases, an improvement in these same standards, personnel and equipment at overseas locations.
It should be noted that, with the exception of the 9/11 plot, virtually all hijack and explosive threats against US Civil Aviation in the past 20+ years have originated outside the US. The Pan Am 103 bag entered the system in Malta. The Ramsey Youssef plot to bring down 11 US Flights was headquartered in Manila while Richard Reed boarded a US Flight in Paris. Abdulmutallab boarded in Amsterdam.
It would not be the intent of the study to point the way toward new (TSA standardized and regulated) aviation security agreements with industrialized countries. There are far too many diplomatic and political problems in these areas to make such a program currently feasible. Thus, the focus will not be on Israel, Canada, and ECAC (European Civil Aviation Conference) countries. It would also not be realistic to engage with Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, China, Singapore or Malaysia.
The introduction of the idea should be in a region, like South America or the Caribbean, where many bi-lateral assistance programs in the counter-narcotics and security areas are already in place.
A contractor (as opposed to a bureaucrat or diplomat) could be responsible for securing an agreement with a host government and airline to allow a US funded and sponsored test of an enhanced security system. This would include TSA certified EDS, explosive detection systems, for hold baggage screening and, for the checkpoint, a TSA approved AT x-ray (AT), a TSA approved walk through and hand held metal detector as well as a TSA approved Trace Detection System. Body Scanning would be provided as well. An integrated, high threat lane could be provided after proof of concept.
In addition to the equipment a TSA approved training program would be exported to the location along with a supervisory level employee of the contractor. This employee would be responsible for the re-occurring training and supervision of a locally supplied guard force that would be dedicated to the screening of a defined sub-set of US bound flights. A training specialist also experienced with TSA hiring and employee screening procedures would be brought in to assist with the initial hiring and training. Qualification standards and training requirements would exactly mirror those of TSA.
A confidential red team method would be established and a series of test runs, utilizing a combination of TIP and simulated live threats, would be introduced into the system to verify operator performance. As a control a local checkpoint, not in any way associated with the project, would be tested in exactly the same
manner as the TSA “clone”.
It is anticipated that all checkpoint and EDS equipment would be “donated” for the duration of the test which, it is projected, would continue for between four and six months. Getting an agreement from equipment manufacturers for such a project would not be very difficult in that it would be in their direct interest to participate.
This test duration would allow for a start up, installation, training and shakedown period of two months along with an operational period long enough to develop statistically meaningful results in terms of performance. This is a complex logistical and technical challenge and some flexibility would have to be built into the schedule as well as the funding.
There are many Governments in the region who would welcome assistance with their Aviation Security Infrastructure. Imagine how many checkpoints could be supplied for the cost of one drug hunting helicopter. A number of USAID Programs in the past (I participated in one myself in Cairo in the early 90’s) have provided aviation security equipment to foreign governments. This would be more of a “total systems” approach with an eye to continuous improvement, monitoring and upgrade.
While the “front door” security enhancement agreements with our allies in Brussels are evolving in the “European” manner it actually could be quicker (and easier in some respects) to begin to study the feasibility of further securing our carriers in places like Kingston, Bogotá and Lima while struggling with our own “issues” and “challenges” here at home.
John Huey
John H Huey & Associates
Cell: 202-641-3960
Email: jhuey92@yahoo.com






















