The Success in Al Anbar

by
Larry C Johnson

The success achieved in Al Anbar has nothing to do with the surge and everything to do with finally tapping into genuine experts who know and understand Iraq. One of these is Pat Lang. In today’s Washington Post, Walter Pincus reports:

Fourteen months ago, a 300-page Defense Department-sponsored research paper titled “Iraq Tribal Study: Al-Anbar Governorate” was completed and delivered to the Pentagon. That report — put together by a distinguished group of retired military counterinsurgency specialists and academics, each with Iraq experience — was circulated in the Army’s Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., at the time led by then-Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, now the top U.S. commander in Iraq. The study proposed changing how the United States interacts with Sunni tribal leaders, eventually contributing to winning their support in fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq forces.

Walter’s editors would not let him identify the experts. The study (actually it is a book) is titled,

Iraq Tribal Study – Al-Anbar Governorate:
The Albu Fahd Tribe, The Albu Mahal Tribe and the Albu Issa Tribe

Here are the key participants:

Study Director and Primary Researcher:

Lin Todd
Contributing Researchers:
W. Patrick Lang, Jr., Colonel, US Army (Retired)
R. Alan King
Andrea V. Jackson
Montgomery McFate, PhD
Ahmed S. Hashim, PhD
Jeremy S. Harrington
Research and Writing Completed: June 18, 2006
Study Conducted Under Contract with the Department of Defense.

You can get a feel for the book by looking at the Table of Contents:

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER ONE. Introduction 1-1

CHAPTER TWO. Common Historical Characteristics and Aspects
of the Tribes of Iraq and al-Anbar Governorate 2-1
• Key Characteristics of Sunni Arab Identity 2-3
• Arab Ethnicity 2-3
– The Impact of the Arabic Language 2-4
– Arabism 2-5
– Authority in Contemporary Iraq 2-8
• Islam 2-9
– Islam and the State 2-9
– Role of Islam in Politics 2-10
– Islam and Legitimacy 2-11
– Sunni Islam 2-12
– Sunni Islam Madhabs (Schools of Law) 2-13
– Hanafi School 2-13
– Maliki School 2-14
– Shafii School 2-15
– Hanbali School 2-15
– Sunni Islam in Iraq 2-16
– Extremist Forms of Sunni Islam 2-17
– Wahhabism 2-17
– Salafism 2-19
– Takfirism 2-22
– Sunni and Shia Differences 2-23
– Islam and Arabism 2-24
– Role of Islam in Government and Politics in Iraq 2-25
– Women in Islam 2-26
– Piety 2-29
– Fatalism 2-31
– Social Justice 2-31
– Quranic Treatment of Warfare vs. Actual Practice 2-32
– Islam and Tribalism 2-33
• Tribalism and the Bedouin Tribal Ideal 2-36
– Role of Tribes in Society 2-38
– Collectivism 2-39
– Honor and Shame 2-39
– Tribal Structure and Organization 2-41
– Tribes and the Iraqi State 2-44
– Urban vs. Rural Culture 2-44
– Cultural Style of Warfare 2-46
– Greetings, Hospitality, and Privacy 2-47
– Negotiation 2-48
– Conflict Resolution 2-48

CHAPTER THREE. History of Tribes in Iraq 3-1
• General Pattern of Tribalism in Iraq 3-2
• Brief Chronology of the Wars of Conquest of Iraq 3-4
• Ancient Iraq 3-8
• The Arab Conquest 3-9
• Abbasid Caliphate: 750 – 1258 3-11
• The Mongol Invasion: 1258 3-12
• Iraq Under Ottoman Rule: 1534 – 1918 3-13
• WWI and British Mandate: 1914 – 1932 3-19
• The Monarchy: 1932 – 1958 3-22
• The Iraqi Republic: 1958 – 1968 3-26
• The 1968 Baathist Coup – 1980 3-27
• The Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War: 1980 – 1993 3-30
• UN Sanctions and the Demise of the Baath Party: 1993 – 2003 3-38
• The End of the Saddam Era 3-40

CHAPTER FOUR. The Tribes of al-Anbar Governorate 4-1
• Post-Baath Sunni Arab Behavior 4-2
• Sunni Arab Tribal Interests 4-3
• Al-Anbar Governorate 4-4
• The Three Target Tribes: Albu Fahd, Albu Mahal, and Albu Issa 4-5
• The Dulaym Tribal Confederation 4-5
• The Albu Fahd Tribe 4-10
– Ancient History Through 20th Century 4-10
– Territorial Issues 4-11
– Lineage, Linkages, and Alliances 4-11
– Key Traits and Cultural Narratives 4-16
– Actions During Previous Crisis Periods 4-16
– Religion 4-17
– Economic Issues 4-17
– Influential Leaders 4-18
– General Background Since March 2003 4-18
– Participation in Insurgency / Relations with Insurgent Groups 4-19
– Relations with Coalition 4-20
• The Albu Mahal Tribe 4-27
– Ancient History Through 20th Century 4-27
– Territorial Issues 4-27
– Lineage, Linkages, and Alliances 4-28
– Key Traits and Cultural Narratives 4-30
– Actions During Previous Crisis Periods 4-30
– Religion 4-31
– Economic Issues 4-31
– Influential Leaders 4-31
– General Background Since March 2003 4-32
– Participation in Insurgency / Relations with Insurgent Groups 4-32
– Relations with Coalition 4-33
• The Albu Issa Tribe 4-36
– Ancient History Through 20th Century 4-36
– Territorial Issues 4-37
– Lineage, Linkages, and Alliances 4-37
– Key Traits and Cultural Narratives 4-40
– Actions During Previous Crisis Periods 4-40
– Religion 4-41
– Economic Issues 4-41
– Influential Leaders 4-42
– General Background Since March 2003 4-42
– Participation in Insurgency / Relations with Insurgent Groups 4-42
– Relations with Coalition 4-43

CHAPTER FIVE. Tribal Influence – Historical Analysis 5-1
• The Ottoman Experience with the Tribes in Iraq 5-2
• The British Experience with the Tribes in Iraq 5-11
• Counter Insurgency in Oman: The Dhofar Rebellion, 1962-1975 5-31
• Strife in Yemen: British Counter Insurgency Opns in Aden, 1955-1967 5-36
• Tribal Warfare in Saudi Arabia: Ibn Saud’s Consolidation
of Power, 1902-1924 5-39
• Saddam Period in Iraq 5-42

CHAPTER SIX. Analytic and Operational Tools
in Counter Insurgency 6-1
• An Overview of Insurgency 6-1
– Definitions of and Approaches to Analyzing Insurgency 6-2
– Terrorism Versus Insurgency 6-6
– The Nature of Insurgency 6-7
– Elements Common to all Insurgencies 6-9
– The Principles of Insurgent Warfare 6-16
– Insurgency in the Middle East 6-18
• Government Response: An Overview of Counter Insurgency 6-19
– The Evolution of Counter Insurgency Strategy 6-20
– The Three Types of Counter Insurgency Strategies/Responses 2-22
– Principles of “Hearts and Minds” Counter Insurgency Strategy 6-24
• The Need for Operational Tools in Counter Insurgency 6-34
• “The Object Beyond War”: Counter Insurgency and
the Four Tools of Political Competition 6-34
– Coercive Force 6-36
– Ideology 6-42
– Economic Incentive and Disincentive 6-45
– Traditional Authority 6-48

CHAPTER SEVEN – A. Emerging Insights on
Influencing the Tribes of al-Anbar 7A-1
• Implement as Part of an Integrated Strategy 7A-3
• Ensure an In-Depth Understanding of Iraqi and Tribal Culture 7A-4
• Identify Tribes and Tribal Interests 7A-7
• Leverage Traditional Authority 7A-8
• Use a Compelling Ideology 7A-12
• Use Appropriate Coercive Force 7A-16
• Use Economic Incentives and Disincentives 7A-18
• Explore the Use of Non-Iraqi Tribal Intermediaries 7A-19
• Understand Insurgent Use of Tribes 7A-19
• Avoid key pitfalls in Dealing with Tribes 7A-20
• Learn from Previous Coalition Efforts to Influence Iraqi Tribes 7A-22

CHAPTER SEVEN – B. Example Application:
Influencing the Three Target Tribes 7B-1
• How to Persuade the Tribes to Stop Supporting Insurgency 7B-1
• How to Persuade the Tribes to Support the Coalition 7B-2
• Albu Fahd 7B-2
• Albu Mahal 7B-8
• Albu Issa 7B-14
• Observations on the Impact of the Death of Zarqawi 7B-19
Appendices.
Appendix 1. How to Work and Live with Tribesmen
Appendix 2. An Operational View of Islam
Appendix 3. HUMINT in Counter Insurgency
Tribal Map of Iraq
Bibliography.

If the Department of Defense had done studies like this sooner there would be fewer dead Iraqis and Americans. As I have noted in previous blog entries, solving the immediate problem in Al Anbar does not ensure reconciliation with the Shia led government. These tribes are not friends of the Shia and do not see themselves as part of the national Iraqi government. But, at least we have a grassroots solution being put into place and the effective disengagement of U.S. troops killing Iraqis in Al Anbar. That is a step in the right direction.