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“The Greatest Risk…..”

(Editor’s highlight: for those not familiar with our author’s background, Larry Doyle, also known as LD, had a 23 year career on Wall Street. He worked primarily at CS First Boston, Bear Stearns, and JP Morgan Chase. He was a mortgage trader for 15 years, and then sold securitized products and was the National Sales Manager at JPM for the last leg of his career. He is now a private investor and involved with not-for-profit activities).

There remain no shortage of developments in the economy, the markets, and on “the street.” While I could continue to write at length on a number of those topics, I think it is healthy to take a weekend break from the regular hustle and bustle. With a break in the show, perhaps we can take a walk backstage and I can share with you some insights into Wall St. that occurred back in the ’90s but didn’t fully play out until 2008.

Please allow me to set the stage. I joined First Boston (now Credit Suisse) in 1983. I was very fortunate to gain employment at First Boston (FOB) as it was one of, if not, the hottest shops on the Street at the time. FOB was very much a traditional “white shoe” sort of firm. Propriety was important in executing business, although I am sure there were some sort of improprieties that occurred behind the scenes. I was too young to get dragged into anything that pushed the envelope. Although the head of HR threatened to fire me 6 weeks into my tenure (I think she was just trying to scare me), for the most part my 7 year career there was wonderful. I learned the business and developed many great relationships.

I was recruited to join Bear Stearns by an individual for whom I worked with for almost 15 years. I was very hesitant to go to Bear Stearns because it always had a reputation for being an extremely aggressive firm in every regard. That said, the person recruiting me was the most principled individual with whom I ever worked on Wall St. and he and I continue to have a very close relationship. I felt that I was working as much for him, if not even more, than I was working for Bear. I admired and respected his values and integrity!

For those who have read my pieces here at NQ, you have heard me stress how important it is to understand risk. On Wall St. as in any business there are all types of risk. For example, there is market risk, credit risk, interest rate risk, prepayment risk, and counter-party risk amongst others. For anybody involved in the markets, all of these risks are facts of everyday life, but they pale in the face of what many feel is the greatest risk of all, and that is “in never taking risk”. For without risk, there is no reward.

However, in my opinion, there is a greater risk that lurks everyday and for my money is massively mispriced, and that is reputation risk. When I say mispriced, I mean there is no premium high enough to jeopardize one’s personal and professional reputation.

There are plenty of CEOs and senior managers who will tell you how important reputations are, but talk is cheap, and actions speak volumes. Mind you, I have no personal vendetta against Bear Stearns. I had a great 7 years there and learned many valuable skills. In fact, I continue to have many close personal friends from Bear whom I highly respect. I harbor no ill will toward anybody with whom I worked at Bear.

On Wall St. seniority is achieved typically through a string of accomplishments, being profitable, and achieving soft goals as well. At Bear, there was no mistaking that seniority was strictly a function of profitability. That system put a real onus on management to be extremely diligent in overseeing the traders and salesmen. The envelope was ALWAYS being pushed.

Along with the mortgage business, Bear’s other large profit center was the clearance business. This business effectively served as the back office for smaller brokers. It was a very low risk, high return business that generated profitability based on the volume of business executed by clients. Bear’s clearance business profitability was envied on Wall Street.

Let me now introduce you to another firm, that being A.R. Baron. This firm was the ultimate “bucket shop” or “boiler room” operation. Baron cleared their trades through Bear. That clearance provided a level of respectability because settlement letters and trade confirmations would be sent to Baron clients on Bear forms. Thus, Bear was providing an air of respectability where none really existed. In short, Bear sold its reputation for Baron’s business. The Bear-Baron relationship got so big that business magazine Forbes devoted a cover and lead story to it. The magazine cover was a picture of a rusty bucket, symbolizing both Bear and Baron. To be perfectly frank, I did not feel good during that stretch about being a Bear employee.

Ultimately my manager and friend left Bear and shortly thereafter I left to join him at another shop. The story is not over, though.

In 1998, the largest hedge fund in the market was a firm known as Long Term Capital Management. They were massively over-leveraged when the Russian ruble was devalued which put the entire market into total disarray and blew up LTCM in the process. Their positions were so large though that a consortium of Wall St. firms at the behest of the NY Fed pooled their funds to bail out LTCM. Every shop on Wall St. committed capital with one exception, Bear Stearns.

Much as they pushed the envelope in their clearance business, Bear was so driven to protect its own profitability that they were willing to forsake their reputation and relationships with the balance of the Wall St. community at that time of crisis. Thus, Bear reaped the benefits of a calming market without risking their own capital, but they once again knowingly risked their reputation, while perhaps not appreciating it.

Maybe you do not need friends until you really need them.

Fast forward to the Spring of 2008. As the economic stress led to further stress on Wall St., Bear Stearns was faced with increasing liquidity pressure to finance its operations. While senior management scrambled to get funding from institutions both on and off Wall St., the Bear Stearns stock, which had topped out at app $175 a share, was ratcheting lower. The Bear employees owned app. 35% of the firm with the most senior managers owning app 10%. Panic was setting in as the firm scrambled to get funding. Conspiracy theories came flying out of Bear.

On that fateful Sunday evening last Spring when Bear’s management knew that the firm was in the hands of the Fed and the Treasury, the powers that be met at J.P. Morgan. Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPM, had long envied parts of Bear Stearns and was prepared to pay app. $20 a share to take the firm. At that moment, Treasury Secretary Paulson told Dimon, “don’t bid so high.” Dimon thought he was getting a great buy at $20 but Paulson did not want to create moral hazard in a government brokered transaction. Paulson indicated to Dimon that $2, not $20, was a better figure and at that moment Bear’s management having no other options sold the firm. What has never been published in any paper but has been widely discussed on Wall St. is that Paulson was finally enacting the pound of flesh that everybody on Wall St. wanted for Bear’s unwillingness to cooperate in the LTCM meltdown.

Bear had long been praised as a great bond shop with superior risk management. Bear’s stock rocketed during the early part of this decade and was the envy of many. All that said, from my standpoint the market never accurately priced the degree of reputation risk embedded in the Bear franchise. That risk was ultimately the downfall for the firm.

Regrettably for our economy, too many companies in too many industries have also been so highly focused on profitability at the expense of long term franchise value. That “reputational” risk is easily covered during a bull market but now that the tide is going out it is more widely displayed.

LD

Please join us Sunday evening for LD’s Dollars and Sense here at NQ Radio at 8pm. We have plenty to discuss. Check it out at:

My radio show! – DON’T MISS IT!

Thanks also for all who joined in at our inaugural “Central Station.” I hope you enjoyed the ride as much as I.

  • Rainy

    Great article, LD!

    It’s always refreshing to read something from an ‘insider’ ‘s perspective.

    I’m currently an auditor at Deloitte, do ya have any advice on how I can break into the banking industry?

    Thanks

  • LD

    Rainy,

    Glad you enjoyed it. Thanks for the plug.

    I actually received a question like this at our story “Central Station” from MPC.

    Please check that story and that question.

    Let me know what you think.

  • http://theheraclitanfire.blogspot.com/ Craig Della Penna

    Larry:

    This is an interesting look at “how the sausage is made” and no doubt anyone cognizant of Wall St. relationships will appreciate it far more than outsiders like me…

    but…

    The problems we now have cannot be laid at the door of a ‘bad’ BearStearns or ‘bad’ Lehman Bros. What we seem to have here is a universal breakdown of ethics in the financial and regulatory communities. Mortgage brokers made loans that they knew could not possibly be repaid. Banks and brokers ‘re-packaged’ these fraudulent loans and sold them as ‘securitized’ financial vehicles. Investment institutions bought and sold these phantom securities as though they were backed by hard collateral… all without a single oversight or regulatory agency saying “Wait a minute!” at any point along the way.

    The Randian laissez-faire environment cultivated and encouraged by Reagan through Bush has disembowelled our economy and crippled our nation.

    While I value your attempt to communicate about your experiences, I don’t think it sufficient to delicately refer to your former employer BearStearns as ‘extremely aggressive’ any longer. Especially when you make it plain in the next sentence that BS acted as an illegal money launderer for AR Baron.

    I know it’s tough to acknowledge that people you have worked with are scoundrels and thieves but until you and other honest, I presume, WallStreeters can reestablish their ethical credentials and convince us, the ‘marks’ that they know the difference between ‘risk’ and ‘theft’, we will not get out of this mess.

    We need financial workers, brokers and management we can actually trust and we need real regulatory agencies we can trust to oversee the markets.

    Let us know when we can expect to see these emerge, that’s when you’ll start to see us recover from the mess you all have created.

  • getfitnow

    Thanks LD. I’ll continue to follow your writings.

  • LD

    Craig,

    Wow. You have extrapolated a lot more from my piece than I would have ever intended. All I am trying to highlight is that Bear did not value its reputation enough vs its profitability. I am then imputing that many other companies also do not value reputation vs profitability.

    You are reading my use of the term “aggressive” as being “criminal”. That is not accurate.

    The regulatory discussion is also an entirely different topic.

    Drawing the line of culpability if not criminal activity is also an entirely diifferent topic and one that would occupy more time and space than either of us have.

    I merely want to touch on the general topic of reputation.

  • Rainy

    Yep, I read the comment that you had written.

    However, generally, what kind of qualities or experience do you need to get into these small investment banking shops? Is leadership experience very important?

  • Kal

    Quite apart from anythng else, it sounds to me like Paulson engaged in possibly criminal activity in advocating for a lower buyout price.

    And the buyer acted on inside information.

    Are we all so used to pervasive corruption that we don’t even blink anymore at these sorts of things?

  • LD

    Kai….

    I think that you need to appreciate that Bear would have gone out of business and declared bankruptcy within a matter of days. Other potential buyers had looked at the firm but could not get adequate financing in place to make a bid.

    Paulson representing the governemtn actually directed Beaqr to JPM given that JPM had the strongest balance sheet both then and now. He was trying to mitigate systemic risk.

    My point was nothing more than waht I wrote in that Paulson directed the bid to the $2 level to mitigate the moral hazard of holding up a firm that was about to fail while also extracting that pound of flesh.

    Believe me, without government intervention Bear would have failed that weekend as all its lines of financing were being pulled very quickly.

  • http://theheraclitanfire.blogspot.com/ Craig Della Penna

    Larry:

    I understand your desire to limit the discussion and reputation is certainly a subject for concern in the current financial climate.

    I guess I see these pieces of a whole: reputation, criminal liability, unethical business practices, theft, Randian economics, absence of oversight, laissez-faire capitalism, ‘free’ markets. They all seem to feed each other and all contribute to creating the current debacle.

    I’m not really sure how to talk about one part of this without talking about all the others…

    Sorry to veer from your intent but that’s how I see it.

    I’ll stop now and let things go their own way.

  • TeakwoodKite

    LD, I am interested in knowing if one should would defer income distributions of principle and keep the investment dollars in play.

    As a kid growing up and taking the train back to Long Island from the city, watching all the Wall street types in the bar car, was a funny twist on “integrity”. Most of these men looked whipped and the liquor they drank and smoke in the air could not hide the stress.

  • fiscalliberal

    LD – Topics for the show tonight

    your comment on Paulson advising JPM on the price makes me wonder on what role he is playing with AIG. Story is that downfall of AIG would have hurt Goldman Sacks a lot. Paulson is former Goldman Sacks.

    Also – as a broker were you a investor or a packager of the securities. Can you offer any comment regarding the rating agencies and integrety.

  • LD

    Craig,

    I appreciate and respect your line of thought but in addressing it in that fashion it effectively paints EVERYBODY involved in the process with the same brush.

    Now there is certainly plenty of blame to go around in all the different lines of the business that you referenced but IMO it is not a black/white situation.

    It does make for a very healthy debate, though.

    Not sure if you saw th epiece I wrote on November 12th about Wall St. but you may enjoy it as I try to highlight the development of the business over the last 20+ years.

  • LD

    Rainy,

    I coudl write volumes on this topic. In fact, I do have plans on addressing this topic in January.

    I would be doing this a disservice by trying to summarize in a few sentences.

    That said, I will try to list a few qualities that are consistent:

    analytical
    competitive
    disciplined
    leadership
    strong written and speaking skills

    Proven track record academically and in prior experiences.

    It’s a process but hopefully this gives you a little insight. Look for more in January.

  • rolling_thunder

    you have heard me stress how important it is to understand risk. On Wall St. as in any business there are all types of risk. For example, there is market risk, credit risk, interest rate risk, prepayment risk, and counter-party risk amongst others. For anybody involved in the markets, all of these risks are facts of everyday life, but they pale in the face of what many feel is the greatest risk of all, and that is “in never taking risk”. For without risk, there is no reward.

    Thing is…they viewed these sub prime loans as NO RISK to them because they could hide the risky facts and pass the risk on to investors in the repackaging of the notes.
    But yes..keep the focus on risk, by all means. It may be the crux of the problem. Now the pendulum has swung the other way. No one is taking ANY risk and loans as well as the economy are frozen.
    How about this RISK>>>> The players who brought down the house of cards are NOW either directly or indirectly merged with Fraudbama by way of being in his cabinet or as an independent advisor. After all, they financed his campaign. Got any HOPE yet?

  • LD

    fiscal….we have lots to cover on the show …i will address these if time allows…otherwise will address at central station…

  • typical.white.person

    He was a mortgage trader for 15 years, and then sold securitized products and was the National Sales Manager at JPM for the last leg of his career. He is now a private investor and involved with not-for-profit activities).

    So…LD is one of ‘em who should be hung by his toe nails for enabling this housing bubble, huh?

    …just kidding :-)

  • AnnieO

    LD-Thanks for the article.

    I stumbled upon a video on youtube saying that the govt knows it’s going to be broke by mid-2009, and Congress has had a secret meeting on this in March 2008.

    Have you heard anything about this?

  • TeakwoodKite

    Hey AnnieO, Link?

    Happy Holidays.

  • AnnieO
  • TeakwoodKite

    Thanks. :)

  • rolling_thunder

    Not LD-Obama…look in the archives about ACORN and fraudO threatening lawsuits to banks who wouldn’t give loans to deadbeats low income people who couldn’t pay a mortgage.

  • rolling_thunder

    I’m aware of this meeting.

    There’ll be martial law and food scarcity.

  • AnnieO

    Happy Holidays to you, too!

  • AnnieO

    Scary, huh. I hope it’s not true. If so, there goes FDIC, etc.

  • rolling_thunder

    Anyhow, good radio show tonight. I love the discussion. Keep it going.

    As for the ‘reputation’, so much is overlooked and the bar has been lowered so much that States are beginning to legislate “ETHICS” because the average person and company’s moral compass is shot to hell. Fudiciary duty and national registry’s with fingerprints are being enacted and soon to be nationwide.

    The guy who MADE OFF with over 50B of other people’s money has the PERFECT name, don’t ‘ya think? His name is Mr Madeoff with all those people’s money.
    I know someone who lost 8mm (his entire lifetime savings) that the Made Off company bamboozled…poor guy..he’ll be homeless.

  • rolling_thunder

    FDIC is holding so many bad insturments from failed banks it should file bankruptcy too.

    This is the end of life as we have known it…now the Global financial new world order will take place shortly. It’s been in the works for a long time and they found Obama to be the front man for this plan. Kerry is in on it.

  • justsomeone

    rolling_thunder, so what do you suggest? buy gold? m.r.i.s? You’re the financial planner…give us a clue

  • justsomeone

    rolling_thunder, Please describe the “Global financial new world order”? Does your concept have anything to do with that big international meeting coming up in March that Sarkozy has been talking about?

  • justsomeone

    LD, what do you think? Is FDIC near broke?

  • LD

    Teak….Good question. There are as many answers for your question as there are investors in the market. It all depends on your cash flow needs, your overall exposure to different sectors of the market, your tolerance for risk, and most importantly what you think of that individual investment.

    Address those questions and I hope you can find your answer.

    The point of your question, though, ultimately touches on the most important but often least publicized skill in investing and that is to maximize savings!!

    Hope this helps.

  • LD

    Annie…

    I think that we all need to be careful in the following:

    1. managing our personal finances…
    2. developing an understanding of what is going on in the economy.

    I hope that those who are following our readings/radio here at NQ have been developing a stronger understanding of each of these points.

    This video clip does touch on some issues that we have tried to highlight (honestly I wish that I was writing throughout the Summer to share my thoughts then but alas…)including:

    1. struggling economy…getting worse before it gets better
    2. inflation…when they say that the governments finances will collapse do not forget that the U.S. government has the ability to print money. We will not run out of money but the value of that money may very well decline. We have tried to consistently highlight this point throughout our writings/shows.

    IMO, they are stretching when they talk about martial law, spying on average American citizens, and civil war.

    I do think that crime will increase as people become more financially strapped. Could there be social unrest in certain towns/cities? Perhaps. Civil War? By including commentary on a topic like that along with martial law, I believe a clip like this loses a lot of credibility.

    Hope these insights help. Again, they are merely my opinions but I think we want to remain levelheaded as we work our way through this.

  • LD

    Just…nope, the FDIC still has app 50bln in reserves. They can replenish those reserves if need be by imposing ever higher premiums on the banks that fund them. Knowing that those premiums are likely to increase is just another reason why banks want to increase their capital base and restrict credit.

    One wild ride on the way up and one massive and vicious unwind on the way down!

  • LD

    Rolling…thanks for the plug. Glad that you enjoy the show and the ongoing dialogue.

  • LD

    Fiscal…

    While on Wall St. I traded mortgage pass-thrus that were issueds by Fannie, Freddie, and Ginnie. The market that I traded provided liquidity to the secondary mortgage market.

    When I was a salesman i covered large institutional clients and then managed our institutional sales effort at JPM. We sold the full array of mortgage related products, but with only a limited presence in the sub-prime space. The reason for that is that Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPM made the decision that JPM would not originate much of that product. Wise move on his part.

    The rating agencies were totally conflicted. They were paid by the issuers of the deals and were thus competing to get more deals. In competing for those deals, though, the issuers pressured them to cut corners in their ratings. Did they knowingly rate bonds too high? IMO, they neither had the human capital to fully appreciate the risks embedded in the underlying loans nor did they adjust ratings quickly enough as the market adjusted.

    Certainly the ratings agencies “business model” needs to change and I am sure it will in 2009.

    In regard to Paulson and AIG, much like the embedded losses within the banking system that nobody wants to fully and publicly estimate, nobody including Paulson wants to publicly guesstimate the losses at AIG. This particular situation is another case of massive systemic risk.

  • AnnieO

    Thanks. Your insights do help and that’s why I always look forward to your posts.

  • mary

    Thanks for this most informative article. I’d like to know if Larry has written any books on the current financial crisis and how small businesses run by women can somehow grow to a sufficiently important financial concern to be taken seriously by Wall Street…
    Also has Larry written a post/article on the Obama’s presidency effect on the markets. I am concerned that government monies given to banks and investment firms are substituting for private investment. How will Obama successfully oversee the banks, etc. in the long term. Bush’s lack of regulatory input caused this. But it started in l999 when investment and insurance functions were added to banking.
    This historical progression to the mess we’re in and the culpability of the Bush Government to the world at large’s financial markets needs exploration….May Larry can write about it (in a book?)….
    Thanks for post! Nice to have diversity….

  • mary

    MERRY XMAS TO NO QUARTER STAFF!

  • LD

    Mary….I jsut saw your post. I have only been writing for the last three months so no books yet.

    I am glad that you enjoyed this piece. You can access all of my writing by clicking on my LD byline and then clicking on “see authors posts”.

    LD

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