The world focused on the Northern areas of Pakistan to capture or kill the al-Qaeda or Taliban operatives. But the harsh reality is that even if these operatives are eliminated, there are other outfits in the rest of the southern part of Pakistan that have the same aims, will and training as that of al-Qaeda or Taliban.

After 2001 Pakistanis were spoon fed the propaganda that the violence in Pakistan is due to America’s presence in Afghanistan. As a result, many hate the U.S. intervention and see Islamists as the defenders of Pakistani sovereignty. Those who support the Islamists for their religious beliefs are relatively few in number, but they are better organized. The arrests of extremists depends on the willingness of Pakistan’s secret agencies and/or the influence of the Saudi government.

The dual policy of keeping the U.S. happy while supporting the terrorist outfits was charted out by the then-President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf. He half-heartedly banned some 23 organizations but failed — deliberately — to bring their sponsors to justice.

The story of Southern part of Pakistan is much scarier than the Northern part. Just as the ten-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approached, those “banned” outfits were on the rise, exploiting the anti-Americanism in the country and misusing the name of religion.

Jaish-e-Muhammad, the group blamed for an attack on the Indian parliament, is the second largest jihadi group in Southern Punjab. It carries out regular public gatherings and has strong influence in the U.K., Europe, Dubai, Saudi Arabia and even in the U.S. Libya’s Moammar Gaddafi was their financial patron-in-chief at one point. Another major financer is Saudi Arabia.

JeM changed its name a few times because of the “ban.” It went from Khudam-al-Islam to Al Rehmat Trust International to Usman Trust. Currently it is operating under the banner of Al Shafi Islamic Medical. Its publications were never out of print.

The failed Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, spent much of his time at a JeM madrassa in Karachi. He was transported to the North later by Laskhar-e-Jhangvi for further training.

LeJ’s parent organization — Sipah Sahaba Pakistan — changed its name from Millat-e-Islamia to International Quran Movement to Ehle Sunnat wa Jamaat. Its propaganda organ publications were available to the masses outside mosques and various market places.

The LeJ formed and operated its new wing, also known as Lashkar e Jhangvi al Almi (LeJ International). With its headquarters in Pakistan, it covers Europe and the U.K. The LeJ is organized into small cells of around eight cadres each, who operate independently of the others.

LeJ leader Malik Ishaq told an Urdu newspaper about his involvement in the killings of 102 people. He was allowed a stipend and provided a mobile phone in jail. Ishaq was released this year after the courts found no evidence against him.

Gen. Musharraf’s government carried out just one operation against the Islamic fundamentalists, under pressure from the Chinese government, when he ordered the Red Mosque Siege. Pakistani intelligence officials said they found letters from Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to the leaders of the mosque, directing them to conduct an armed revolt. One of the leaders was released by the courts later.

The LeJ, JeM and Harkat ul Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI) formed a common front called Lashkar-e-Umer with countrywide branches for close cooperation and pooled resources. These groups still support each other in one form or another.

The Karachi-based Al Rasheed Trust, was “banned” and listed as a terrorist group by the U.S. State Department on September 22, 2001. The group is still operating and its chief was one of the few who had direct access to bin Laden.

Similarly, another group, the Falah-e-Isnaniyat Foundation (FIF) is linked with Lashkar and Jamat-al-Dawa and protected by the security establishment. These groups are also supported and funded by the Saudis.

The freehand operations of these groups have radicalized Pakistani society. Anti-Americanism spreads while Arabization has taken hold.

There are more and more mosques in each city, many run by such outfits. In some places three separate mosques of different sects are built next to each other. The sermons delivered there go unchecked and ultimately fuel the hatred and twisted ideology of dividing Muslims and bringing ‘sharia’ of their liking to the world. Public Billboards promoting jihad and hatred of America are everywhere cloaked as appeals for “charity.”

Pakistan’s internal crises include a deep cynicism that has seeped into every nook and cranny of everyday life. Politically, the army continues to run the popular narrative. Socially, if liberals talk about rapprochement with India, they’re accused of being controlled by RAW, the C.I.A. or the Zionists — or all three. The radical view that it’s acceptable to kill Shi’a, Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians and destroy their places of worship is widespread.

Because of this chaos, ordinary Pakistanis who want to travel, work and study abroad are finding it harder to do so. In the eyes of many immigration officials around the world, to be Pakistani is synonymous with being a criminal.

It’s been said many times that 9/11 changed the world. After the attacks, Afghanistan and Pakistan felt the heat.

Ten years later, the diseases that had been contained in Pakistan metastasize more rapidly than ever. Pakistan’s militants, all of them, are a threat to international peace. If the West’s strategy for combating radicalism continues on its present parochial course, the world will feel the heat.

Wow. I am not surprised by this news, though, in all honesty. The photo released by the White House as the Powers-That-Be watched the mission unfold (or at least some of it), made that abundantly clear:

From the get-go, it looked to me like Obama was sitting in the “Kid’s Chair,” while the adults were around the big table. If the White House Insider is accurate, and Larry Johnson is now stating after intel he’s received that the insider is at least 80% accurate, that’s exactly what was going on here. The decision had been made, and not by Obama. As the Insider stated in a previous interview, it was a coup, a term the insider stands by in the update on May 3, 2011 to SocyBerty.

Make no mistake – this is huge. Huge.

So, who did give the order to go after Osama bin Laden? It was Leon Panetta, backed by Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, David Petraeus, and Jim Clapper. Not Barack Obama, despite his taking credit for it (though that is not a surprise, either – that has been his MO for years and years). If you have not had your fill of Obama BS, just watch his “60 Minutes” interview in which he blathers on and on about his “plan.” As you will read below, there was no such plan, at least not from him.

There is so much to this interview, and I urge you to read the complete post, but here are some key components:

Q: You stated that President Obama was “overruled” by military/intelligence officials regarding the decision to send in military specialists into the Osama Bin Laden compound. Was that accurate?

A: I was told – in these exact terms, “we overruled him.” (Obama) I have since followed up and received further details on exactly what that meant, as well as the specifics of how Leon Panetta worked around the president’s “persistent hesitation to act.” There appears NOT to have been an outright overruling of any specific position by President Obama, simply because there was no specific position from the president to do so. President Obama was, in this case, as in all others, working as an absentee president. (Emphasis mine.)

I mentioned above who was doing the overruling – a star-studded group if ever there was one (well, except for maybe Jim Clapper – you remember him – the Director Of Intelligence who seemed woefully ignorant of Intelligence, who claimed the Muslim Brotherhood was “largely secular.” Yes, that guy.). Anyway, it was this group against Valerie Jarrett, and her puppet, Obama:

I was correct in stating there had been a push to invade the compound for several weeks if not months, primarily led by Leon Panetta, Hillary Clinton, Robert Gates, David Petraeus, and Jim Clapper. The primary opposition to this plan originated from Valerie Jarrett, and it was her opposition that was enough to create uncertainty within President Obama. Obama would meet with various components of the pro-invasion faction, almost always with Jarrett present, and then often fail to indicate his position. This situation continued for some time, though the division between Jarrett/Obama and the rest intensified more recently, most notably from Hillary Clinton. She was livid over the president’s failure to act, and her office began a campaign of anonymous leaks to the media indicating such. As for Jarrett, her concern rested on two primary fronts. One, that the military action could fail and harm the president’s already weakened standing with both the American public and the world. Second, that the attack would be viewed as an act of aggression against Muslims, and further destabilize conditions in the Middle East.

Wow. Yes, those should be our primary concerns when it comes to National Security, would it make Obama look bad, and angering Muslims? Good grief. That does confirm what many of us have thought, though. Our National Security has been couched by how it will appear to Muslims around the world, not about what is best for the United States of America. There is something seriously, seriously wrong with that.

The interviewer then asked about how they got Obama to change his opinion, to which the insider said they didn’t – Obama didn’t HAVE an opinion. The complete response is too long to include here, but the term “masterful manipulation” was used to describe how Leon Panetta made this happen. Here is just part of the response by the Insider:

[snip] Basically, the whole damn operation was already ready to go – including the specific team support Intel necessary to engage the enemy within hours of being given notice. Panetta then made plans to proceed with an on-ground assault. This information reached either Hillary Clinton or Robert Gates first (likely via military contacts directly associated with the impending mission) who then informed the other. Those two then met with Panetta, who informed each of them he had been given the authority by the president to proceed with a mission if the opportunity presented itself. Both Gates and Clinton warned Panetta of the implications of that authority – namely he was possibly being made into a scapegoat. Panetta admitted that possibility, but felt the opportunity to get Bin Laden outweighed that risk. During that meeting, Hillary Clinton was first to pledge her full support for Panetta, indicating she would defend him if necessary. Similar support was then followed by Gates. The following day, and with Panetta’s permission, Clinton met in private with Bill Daley and urged him to get the president’s full and open approval of the Panetta plan. Daley agreed such approval would be of great benefit to the action, and instructed Clinton to delay proceeding until he had secured that approval. Daley contacted Clinton within hours of their meeting indicating Jarrett refused to allow the president to give that approval (emphasis mine). Daley then informed Clinton that he too would fully support Panetta in his actions, even if it meant disclosing the president’s indecision to the American public should that action fail to produce a successful conclusion. Clinton took that message back to Panetta and the CIA director initiated the 48 hour engagement order. At this point, the President of the United States was not informed of the engagement order – it did not originate from him, and for several hours after the order had been given and the special ops forces were preparing for action into Pakistan from their position in Afghanistan, Daley successfully kept Obama and Jarrett insulated from that order. [snip] (Click here to read the rest.)

At this point, you may be wondering just who Valerie Jarrett is, and why she has so much influence over Obama, more so than a number of top Cabinet officials. Well, she is the Senior Advisor to the President now, but prior to that worked for Mayor Richard Daley, and hired Michelle Obama as an assistant to the mayor. Oh, but get this – only after “…re-assuring Michelle’s fiancé, Barack Obama, that the job was right for her.” Gee, sexist much?

Anyway, here are some of the ways in which she has been described:

Chicago businesswoman Valerie Jarrett has earned all sorts of nicknames as an aide to President-elect Barack Obama — from “First Friend” to “big sister” to “the other half of Obama’s brain.” As co-chair of his transition team, Jarrett has spent the past week denying rumors, parsing policy changes and insisting that she doesn’t know where she’ll end up in the new administration (although Beltway gossip suggests she may be appointed to Obama’s seat in the Senate). Of her relationship with the 44th commander-in-chief, Jarrett says simply: “He is my dear friend. I would do anything the President of the United States asked me to do.” [snip] (Click here to read the rest.)

And apparently, she has a tremendous amount of sway over Obama in terms of policy, foreign and national. That is quite something for someone who was not elected, or had to pass Congressional scrutiny.

But that is not all there is to Valerie Jarrett (or Michelle Obama). There is more that is not so glowing:

[snip]But not a word about Jarrett’s involvement in Michelle Obama’s patient-dumping scheme at the University of Chicago Medical Center, where Jarrett sat of the board of directors.

And not a word about Jarrett’s involvement in Grove Parc — the Chicago slum complex managed by Jarrett’s company, Habitat, Inc. To this day, Jarrett refuses to answer questions about the dilapidated housing development. [snip](Click here to read the rest.)

Yeah, she’s a piece of work, the embodiment of a Chicago-style politics. But she also is someone who has WAY too much power in the White House, and way too much power over affairs of State.

Again, if only 80% of what the White House Insider says is true, this is damaging stuff, indeed. It explains a lot, though, including Obama’s look while sitting in the Kiddy chair while the mission unfolded, and how fortunate we are that there are actual grown ups in this Administration willing to stick their necks out to protect our nation. One thing is for sure – that does not include Obama or Valerie Jarrett. When push came to shove, Obama continued to cave to Jarrett rather than listen to the people in positions to know better. His incompetence is dwarfed only by his narcissism for taking credit for results for which he had no involvement whatsoever.

One thing is crystal clear – Obama is not presidential material, and he sure as hell should not be president again. At least that’s what I think. How about you?

I had another post all ready to go this morning of Lara Logan’s interview on “60 Minutes,” but that can keep until tomorrow. Today, the big news, as President Obama announced late last night, Osama bin Laden has been killed.

The reports have been a bit conflicting on just how he died, however. Initially, reports stated he had been killed by a drone attack last week, and that they had kept his body to determine through DNA analysis that it was indeed him.

Obama’s statement to the nation, though, claimed that he had (reaffirmed) the order to the CIA to get bin Laden (Bush initially gave the order), and that bin Laden was killed yesterday. Now we are told it was a Navy Seal who took him down, on a mission aided by CIA intel, as well as information gleamed from Khalid Sheik Muhammad at Gitmo. Apparently, the Pakistanis aided the US in this mission as well.

Following are excerpts of Obama’s remarks on this historic event (and I am glad he was finally able to use the word, “terrorist,” since it was one he and his Administration have worked hard not to use. Ahem.):

“Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, and a terrorist who’s responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children.

“It was nearly 10 years ago that a bright September day was darkened by the worst attack on the American people in our history. The images of 9/11 are seared into our national memory — hijacked planes cutting through a cloudless September sky; the Twin Towers collapsing to the ground; black smoke billowing up from the Pentagon; the wreckage of Flight 93 in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, where the actions of heroic citizens saved even more heartbreak and destruction.

“And yet we know that the worst images are those that were unseen to the world. The empty seat at the dinner table. Children who were forced to grow up without their mother or their father. Parents who would never know the feeling of their child’s embrace. Nearly 3,000 citizens taken from us, leaving a gaping hole in our hearts.

“On September 11, 2001, in our time of grief, the American people came together. We offered our neighbors a hand, and we offered the wounded our blood. We reaffirmed our ties to each other, and our love of community and country. On that day, no matter where we came from, what God we prayed to (emphasis mine – you knew it was coming, right?), or what race or ethnicity we were, we were united as one American family.

“We were also united in our resolve to protect our nation and to bring those who committed this vicious attack to justice. We quickly learned that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by al Qaeda — an organization headed by Osama bin Laden, which had openly declared war on the United States and was committed to killing innocents in our country and around the globe. And so we went to war against al Qaeda to protect our citizens, our friends, and our allies.

“Over the last 10 years, thanks to the tireless and heroic work of our military and our counterterrorism professionals, we’ve made great strides in that effort. We’ve disrupted terrorist attacks and strengthened our homeland defense. In Afghanistan, we removed the Taliban government, which had given bin Laden and al Qaeda safe haven and support. And around the globe, we worked with our friends and allies to capture or kill scores of al Qaeda terrorists, including several who were a part of the 9/11 plot.

“Yet Osama bin Laden avoided capture and escaped across the Afghan border into Pakistan. Meanwhile, al Qaeda continued to operate from along that border and operate through its affiliates across the world.

“And so shortly after taking office, I directed Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA, to make the killing or capture of bin Laden the top priority of our war against al Qaeda, even as we continued our broader efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat his network.

“Then, last August, after years of painstaking work by our intelligence community, I was briefed on a possible lead to bin Laden. It was far from certain, and it took many months to run this thread to ground. I met repeatedly with my national security team as we developed more information about the possibility that we had located bin Laden hiding within a compound deep inside of Pakistan. And finally, last week, I determined that we had enough intelligence to take action, and authorized an operation to get Osama bin Laden and bring him to justice.

“Today, at my direction, the United States launched a targeted operation against that compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. A small team of Americans carried out the operation with extraordinary courage and capability. No Americans were harmed. They took care to avoid civilian casualties. After a firefight, they killed Osama bin Laden and took custody of his body.

I admit, while watching this, I was waiting for Obama to say, “I just returned from Pakistan where I, personally, took out Osama bin Laden, with the help of our military. And you thought George Bush was a cowboy. He doesn’t have anything on me.” Sorry, but there were just a few too many “I”‘s in there for someone who has downplayed the whole issue of terrorism.

Yes, he gave the command to proceed, which is good. Yet many are acting as if this is showing great leadership on his part, while to me, it seems like a no-brainer. I mean, really – have our expectations of him sunk so low that the opportunity to take out this mastermind of terror is seen as a sign of “leadership”? Wow.

Back to the comments:

“For over two decades, bin Laden has been al Qaeda’s leader and symbol, and has continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al Qaeda.

“Yet his death does not mark the end of our effort. There’s no doubt that al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us. We must — and we will — remain vigilant at home and abroad.

“As we do, we must also reaffirm that the United States is not — and never will be — at war with Islam. I’ve made clear, just as President Bush did shortly after 9/11, that our war is not against Islam. Bin Laden was not a Muslim leader; he was a mass murderer of Muslims. Indeed, al Qaeda has slaughtered scores of Muslims in many countries, including our own. So his demise should be welcomed by all who believe in peace and human dignity.

Hillary Clinton just made the point that bin Laden killed many Muslims, too, just as Obama did, and that bin Laden had made threats against Pakistanis themselves. One can make of that what one will…

More from Obama:

[snip] “Tonight, I called President Zardari, and my team has also spoken with their Pakistani counterparts. They agree that this is a good and historic day for both of our nations. And going forward, it is essential that Pakistan continue to join us in the fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates.

“The American people did not choose this fight. It came to our shores, and started with the senseless slaughter of our citizens. After nearly 10 years of service, struggle, and sacrifice, we know well the costs of war. These efforts weigh on me every time I, as Commander-in-Chief, have to sign a letter to a family that has lost a loved one, or look into the eyes of a service member who’s been gravely wounded.

“So Americans understand the costs of war. Yet as a country, we will never tolerate our security being threatened, nor stand idly by when our people have been killed. We will be relentless in defense of our citizens and our friends and allies. We will be true to the values that make us who we are. And on nights like this one, we can say to those families who have lost loved ones to al Qaeda’s terror: Justice has been done.

“Tonight, we give thanks to the countless intelligence and counterterrorism professionals who’ve worked tirelessly to achieve this outcome. The American people do not see their work, nor know their names. But tonight, they feel the satisfaction of their work and the result of their pursuit of justice.

“We give thanks for the men who carried out this operation, for they exemplify the professionalism, patriotism, and unparalleled courage of those who serve our country. And they are part of a generation that has borne the heaviest share of the burden since that September day.

“Finally, let me say to the families who lost loved ones on 9/11 that we have never forgotten your loss, nor wavered in our commitment to see that we do whatever it takes to prevent another attack on our shores.[snip]

There is a bit more to this speech, and you can click here to read it.

Can I just say, though, listening and watching Obama last night really puts a lie to the meme that he is such a great speaker. He isn’t. His speech was stilted and halting, with a number of mistakes as he read the teleprompter. It was blatantly clear that he was – you could watch his eyes move.

I am confused as to why they chose to bury bin Laden at sea, and so quickly. I would have thought they would want to perform an autopsy, recover the bullet that killed him, see if he really was ill, all of that. So that choice is interesting to me. Why the rush to dispose of him? Oh, wait – here is why – it is in keeping with Islamic tradition.

Huh? Okay, so Obama makes it crystal clear that bin Laden was not a Muslim leader. However, we do know he was the leader of Al Qaeda, a Muslim organization, but alright. Interesting distinction Obama (and Clinton) are making here. Still,we finally get this mass murderer, we have his body, and we forgo obtaining some answers to uphold his religious tradition? Wow. What do you think about that? Is it an attempt to stave off more attacks?

If so, that is a bit misguided. We KNOW there will be reprisals from Al Qaeda as a result,as Leon Panetta has acknowledged we can expect. Honestly, these people are bound and determined to get us anyway, so taking out this one man who has caused so much damage to our great nation is a reason to be thankful, even if one abhors violence, or killing for any reason.

Bringing justice to this man who has done so much damage to our nation as a result of the tireless efforts of our intelligence community and our highly trained military, is a good day. Thanks to all of those who have worked to this end, though it is not an end to the war on terrorism. Bin Laden may be gone, but there are others out there wishing us harm. Our military and intelligence officers continue to have their work cut out for them, regardless of Obama taking the credit for this, it belongs, IMHO, to those who were on the ground. Well done.

There is a video I want to share with you. It is an impromptu celebration at Ground Zero after learning of bin Laden’s demise. This pretty much says it all, though there are many good videos out there of interviews with family members of those lost on 9/11, and first responders. I urge you to take a look and listen when you have time. Until then, I leave you with this:

UPDATE: A few of you have been kind enough to provide links regarding why Osama bin Laden was buried at sea. Here are the pertinent facts:

[snip] The official described the procedure to NBC News as follows:

* The deceased’s body was washed and then placed in a white sheet.
* The body was placed in a weighted bag.
* A military officer read prepared religious remarks that were translated into Arabic by a native speaker.
* After the words were complete, the body was placed on a prepared flat board, tipped up, whereupon the deceased’s body eased into the sea from the USS Carl Vinson.

The rites sparked a debate about Islamic customs, with some Muslim clerics calling the procedure humiliating and others saying it was proper.

A U.S. official said that the burial decision was made after concluding that it would have been difficult to find a country willing to accept the remains. There also was speculation about worry that a grave site could have become a rallying point for militants.

President Barack Obama said the remains had been handled in accordance with Islamic custom, which requires speedy burial. [snip]

Okay, so there weren’t a lot of countries willing to accept his body. There is cremation, after all.

And how do you feel that so much care was taken to prepare his body according to Islamic tradition? Wow…

Editor’s Note: Special thanks to our videographer Truthtelling007 who has a great compilation of Larry Johnson’s appearances on television. (See a list, and the link to all, in the right column.)

With the closing down of Countdown, I can now say I have a fairly complete archive of the show. Regardless of the opinions people have against/favor of Keith Olbermann…it was the guests that I was looking for. Guests over those 8 years included Larry Johnson, Lawrence Wilkerson, Matthew Alexander, Malcolm Nance, The Wilsons, and many others that I think we can agree are valuable experienced voices. I don’t let hosts distract me if possible.

From the archive: Larry appeared on Countdown in April 2006 to discuss the attack on his former boss, Mary McCarthy and comments on Porter Goss, Valerie Plame and others:

COMMENT FROM LARRY–I enjoyed going on Keith’s show before he turned into a pompous parody of a serious newsman. It is one thing for Keith to rant at George W. Bush. Bush deserved every rant in my book. But Keith missed his chance to occupy the high ground in the middle. Instead he became (or always was) a venomous partisan. I stopped getting invites to appear on Keith’s show once I came out in favor of Hillary. In this aspect MSNBC and FOX are just alike. Fox put me on the persona non grata list after I had the audacity to speak out about the ideological influence guiding the Fox team behind the scenes.

One big difference between Fox and MSNBC. Fox is successful. I don’t know shat Olbermann plans to do next but like Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg we have seen his highwater mark. It is now clear that Keith is no Edward R. Murrow.

It is believed that his cover was blown in retaliation for naming ISI chief Ahamad Shuja Pasha in a US lawsuit by families of 26/11 Mumbai attack victims. The suit asserts that Pasha and other ISI officers were ‘purposefully engaged in the direct provision of material support or resources’ to the planners of the Mumbai attacks.

A similar legal complaint was filed in Pakistan on behalf of Kareem Khan, a resident of North Waziristan who said that his son and brother were killed in a drone strike. Khan was seeking $500 million in compensation, and accusing CIA’s top officer in Pakistan of running a clandestine spying operation out of the United States Embassy.

This locking of horns should have been tackled sensibly. Instead, the confrontation ended up costing CIA an experienced officer. Interestingly, not many Americans known the name of the former CIA station chief, whereas whole of Pakistan is familiar of his name, especially the people in North Waziristan. Yes, North Waziristan, which the US believes is the new haven of militant extremists. 

This is not the first time that the two agencies have engaged in a power struggle. On September 30th this year, a US fighter helicopter crossed into Pakistan airspace and fired on a position occupied by Pakistani soldiers. As a result of this attack, three soldiers were killed and the rest severely injured. 

Hurting an ally came with a huge price for the US when Pakistan halted the flow of NATO supplies into Afghanistan through the Torkham for at least 10 days. It’s not that the trucks were just parked and were driven away after the ban was lifted. The Pakistani agency made sure to set an example and did not guard the trucks. As a result, the trucks were attacked by terrorists. 

These are just two major incidents that happened this year on Pakistan’s home ground, where the CIA, NATO, the Pentagon, the White House and the State Department cannot act without the ISI’s blessing. Its not your turf, but theirs.
Not helping ease relations were notorious incidents such as the threat by an obscure American pastor to burn the Quran, protests against a proposed Islamic Center in New York City and a Pakistani official delegation cutting its trip to United States short because of protocol issues. 

To make matters worse, none of the internecine US-Pakistan clashes were reported properly in the American press. The coverage was either one-sided or full of accusations. The media did cover the NATO trucks blockage, but offered neither context nor an apology for the cause of the attack. It did cover the removal of the CIA spy but did not suggest establishing person-to-person contact rather than strictly military-to-military relations. 

US agencies, whether on or off the ground, have to realize that Pakistan has sacrificed a lot more than it deserves. The Americans at the same time need to know that United States’ presence in Afghanistan has radicalized Pakistanis and turned many of them not only against the West. One count says the Pakistan army has lost more than 3,200 soldiers in recent fighting against Taliban forces along their border with Afghanistan. This does not include the civilians killed by drone attacks or by the suicide bombers.

This little rift between the two agencies is an open secret, and has been going on for years now. Every now and then, the CIA tries to prove that it has more resources and pushes ISI to ‘act as advised’. It needs to bring its ego down a notch, just for the sake of the war which both countries have to win. 

There is another increasingly controversial “K” that U.S. officials should refrain from using, especially in a derogatory manner. And that “K” stands for Karzai. Until recently the United States has treated the Afghan President as a puppet without realizing that his power base has grown in Afghanistan. It’s true that when Karzai was installed by the Bush administration he had little to no support in the country. But just the Bush era has passed and America has voted in a new President, time has not stood still for Karzai. The sooner the US realizes this the better for the Afghanistan, the NATO, the British and the US army.

Over the years Karzai made himself matter in the country while rumors of his impending political death continued to circulate.

The first sign of Karzai’s power was evident last year when the West discredited him during Afghanistan’s presidential elections. His opponent Abdullah Abdullah was openly supported by the Obama administration. The conflicting reports coming out of Afghanistan made the geniuses in Washington conclude that an ethnic Pashtun shouldn’t represent Afghanistan. Karzai didn’t take the news well.

On the ground the situation was quite different. An intelligence expert based in Afghanistan said that if Abdullah Abdullah runs again he will still lose to Karzai. The reason? Abdullah Abdullah is of Tajik ethnicity. It’s on the record that when Karzai agreed to a second round run-off vote Dr. Abdullah withdrew from the race. Abdullah’s claims that he had dropped his bid because of overwhelming voter fraud was only part of the story.

This doesn’t mean that the elections were clean. From Peter Galbraith to the U.N. to Hamid Karzai, there was agreement that ballot mishandling and corruption took place — but what do you expect from a country run by the Taliban for five years and then taken over by the Western armies with little to no understanding of internal Afghan dynamics? If Karzai’s brother is a warlord and a drug trafficker, Abdullah Abdullah has such criminals in his camp too, the difference being that Karzai’s brother is reported to be helping U.S. intelligence.

Hamid Karzai’s recent statements about joining with the Taliban have been unhinged, but they reflect his growing frustration with his Western sponsors. Just last month Karzai, like a shrewd chess player, made a point of inviting Iran’s Ahmadinejad to visit Afghanistan, presumably as a goodwill gesture to reach out to his neighbors. Afghanistan can not change its neighbors at the behest of the United States – but Karzai can certainly rattle some cages when need be.

That President Obama’s schedule suddenly opened up following that visit, necessitating a rush to Kabul that speaks not only to the wiliness of Karzai, but also the importance of Afghanistan and, more disturbingly, the disarray of U.S. policy toward that country. Angered by Karzai’s threats to join with the Taliban, the White House has started threatening to call off Karzai’s trip to the U.S.

A bevy of questionable opinions being circulated in the American press are adding fuel to the fire. Such suggestions look good on paper but are not practically executable. This Pentagon theory will bear no results, as it is impossible to deploy the army countrywide, take out the middle tear of Taliban sympathizers and eventually nab the upper tier. Logically, the army doesn’t know who is Taliban and who is not; furthermore, who are the “good” and “bad” Taliban? Who can be negotiated with and brought into political talks and which elements are too ideologically hardened and radicalized, thereby incapable of negotiating?

Such an approach indicates that decision makers are living in lalaland while ground realities are totally different, especially when Obama wants to bring back troops while Karzai is willing to talk to ‘good Taliban’. Karzai is another ‘K’ that can not be ignored.

The significance of the Obama-Karzai meeting and a look at the military strategy being implemented in Afghanistan will be addressed in my next writeup.

–
Crosspost from: The Pakistan Update

The female CIA officers killed in December were a testament to the progress made in a historically paternalistic agency. Former CIA officer Valerie Wilson on the cracks in the spy world’s ceiling.

The shocking massacre in Khost, Afghanistan, on December 30th left seven CIA officers dead by an al Qaeda suicide bomber at their base. Among the fallen: two women, one the chief of base and reportedly a mother of three. She was no cardboard airhead figure toting an AK-47, but rather a highly trained intelligence professional who was doing her job when she and her colleagues paid the ultimate sacrifice. It is time to recognize that women play a vital role in ensuring our national security and that they are very much on the frontlines, taking all the same risks but recognized and credited much less than their male counterparts.

As a former covert CIA operations officer, I have always been nonplussed by the portrayal of female CIA officers in the popular media. The girl (and it’s always a girl) is usually nothing more substantial than a one-dimensional cartoon character, always stunningly sexy without much in the way of intellect to balance a heavy reliance on sheer physicality. For decades, the message has been drummed into the public mind that female CIA officers must rely on their good looks and clever ways with a weapon to be successful. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve been asked by seemingly reasonable people whether I had to sleep with sources to get the intelligence, and did I carry a gun and have I ever killed anyone? The answer to each of those questions: no.

The female pioneers at the CIA were tough as nails—they had to be. I met some of these women during my time at the CIA and they could intimidate me like nobody else.

The CIA was the epitome of the “old boys club” for years. The World War II precursor to the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services, was often jokingly, but quite accurately, referred to as “Oh, So Social.” CIA’s premier spy cadre was carefully recruited from the male, moneyed, white, establishment crowd that went to the Ivies. For the first four decades of the CIA’s existence, the very few females that got into operations were usually drawn from the secretarial or support staffs. These smart, persistent, and gutsy women tired of seeing the men have all the fun and back-doored themselves into case-officer jobs—meeting and recruiting assets, planning ops, and in some rare cases in the 1970s, managing operations overseas. These women were tough as nails—they had to be—and they poured everything into their careers, often at the expense of their personal lives. I met some of these women during my time at the CIA and they could intimidate me like nobody else. My female colleagues and I owe them a deep debt of gratitude for their groundbreaking careers.

In the mid-1980s, with the Reagan military buildup to counter the perceived Soviet threat, the agency benefited and grew significantly in size. Under Director Bill Casey, the CIA loosened its recruitment policies, involving schools other than the Ivies. Additionally, they began hiring women specifically to go into operations. Of course, attitudes take a long time to change and many a dinosaur who thought women should really just be at home and not running clandestine agents still roamed the halls at headquarters. At one point, someone made an observation to me that I think helps explain the very slow acceptance of women ops officers in the CIA. She noted that white men, used to being on the top of the heap, in power and giving orders, identified most closely with young, white men like themselves. They understood them and felt comfortable being their bosses (“He’s just like me when I was a rookie!”). As a consequence, it was the young men who got the plum assignments and opportunities for advancement that didn’t come nearly as often for the women, despite increasing gender equality in the operational career track. The CIA’s increasing corporate commitment to diversity in the 1990s applied not only to gender, but to race and ethnicity as well. In the agency—as in workplaces across America—it takes time for attitudes and actions to catch up to the broader aspirations espoused at the top.

In 1991, women in the CIA had enough of the blatant discrimination and protested to senior agency officials. In response, the CIA commissioned the “Glass Ceiling Study” to see if artificial barriers against advancement existed. Surprise! They did. Partly as a result of the study, the agency was forced to pay out $1 million in 1995 to more than 400 women in a class-action suit involving sex discrimination. The case cited lack of promotions, harassment on the job, and dead-end assignments. In my opinion, the lawsuit cost women CIA officers some ground because it tended to ossify ingrained attitudes that the girls can’t play like the boys. However, it was necessary and did eventually help level the playing field.

Despite these cultural obstacles, there is a long and storied history of women serving their country loyally. From Julia Child to Virginia Hall (an OSS heroine who worked behind enemy lines in France during World War II), there is no doubt that women played critical roles in maintaining America’s national security. From my admittedly biased point of view, I don’t know why it took so long for the CIA to figure out that in many respects, women can make better operations officers. First of all, women are less threatening and, in many parts of the world, simply blend into the background and are dismissed as of little consequence. This obviously works to a woman’s advantage if she is making a clandestine meeting. Women know how to flatter, are generally more observant, and definitely read body language better. One of the most important skills an ops officer must have is the ability to walk into an unknown and perhaps dangerous environment (and this can’t be taught) to “get it” right away. Finally, there is the simple fact that being female offers the immediately understandable and obvious reason to be in a clandestine meeting with a male.

As I was working my way up the ranks at the CIA, I began to look around for a female mentor—someone who could show me how it was done. Someone who was able to retain her femininity, able to juggle a family, and still be respected for her operational judgment. I’m sorry to say that I never found that role model. All the potential mentors in the ops arena, at least, were either divorced, had no children, or struck me as dysfunctional in some way. It was distressing, but not surprising. That was the legacy of waiting so long to bring women into the ops ranks in a meaningful way. The glass ceiling at the CIA, like most of corporate America, is still in place, but at least it has plenty of cracks.

It is obvious that one doesn’t join the CIA for public glory. You can’t tell anyone where you really work. If you are killed in the line of duty, no one knows your name. What you do get is a star on the wall in the lobby at headquarters. One doesn’t join the CIA for financial gain. If you are lucky, and work really hard, you might retire at a level of GS-15, and make around $100,000 a year. One joins the CIA because it is a unique opportunity to serve your country, and at the risk of sounding too corny, serving something larger than yourself. You are doing something interesting, often overseas. I believe that there is a clear link between how female CIA officers are portrayed in the media and the continuing, if diminishing, discrimination against women in the agency itself. The chief of base who died in Khost deserves to be remembered in history as a woman doing her job in a dangerous part of the world, not some silly cartoon character.

Valerie Wilson is a former CIA operative whose covert identity was revealed in a syndicated newspaper article in 2003. She is the author of Fair Game: My Life as a Spy, My Betrayal by the White House.

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It is time for serious soul-searching regarding the role of the CIA and the intelligence community. Last month’s operational and intelligence failures led to the deaths of seven CIA officers in Afghanistan and might have resulted in nearly 300 deaths on a Northwest Airlines plane headed for Detroit.

It is particularly shocking that President Barack Obama’s chief of counterterrorism, John Brennan, conceded that the latter failure was caused by the fact that there was “no one intelligence entity or team or task force assigned responsibility for doing a follow-up investigation” of the considerable intelligence that was collected.

It is unbelievable that the President had to order the creation of a system for tracking threat reports. The failures beg the question of what have we learned since 9/11.

Previous CIA failures regarding the unanticipated decline and fall of the Soviet Union, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the run-up to the Iraq War demonstrate a $75 billion intelligence enterprise that can provide neither strategic nor tactical warning to policymakers and is reluctant to provide uncomfortable truth to power.

The serious problems that need to be addressed include the important nexus between intelligence and policy — and the need for a CIA that is not beholden to policy or political interests; the militarization of the intelligence community – which must be reversed; the lack of Congressional oversight – which must be corrected, and the decline of operational tradecraft – which must be investigated.

Before addressing reform in Part II, however, we must first confront the mythology that surrounds the intelligence enterprise.

The Greatest Myth: The 9/11 Commission offered insight into the systemic problems of the CIA and the intelligence community. The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 solved the problems that had been exposed by the 9/11 Commission by creating a director of national intelligence, the so-called intelligence tsar.

In fact, the 9/11 Commission failed to use the powers it had been given to explore the reasons for the 9/11 intelligence failure.

It deferred unnecessarily to the White House’s use of “executive privilege,” and failed to stand up to CIA Director George Tenet, who refused to permit commissioners to debrief prisoners held by the CIA. The commission failed to use its subpoena powers and lacked experience in the world of the intelligence community.

The CIA’s Inspector General concluded that the 9/11 failure was about personal failures, accountability and bureaucratic ineptitude. The same could be said for the Christmas Day events. The commission focused on larger issues: budgets and funding, organizational problems and structural fixes.

The Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 actually made a bad situation worse. It created a new bureaucracy under a director of national intelligence (DNI) beholden to the White House, as well as a centralized system that stifles creative thinking and risks more politicized intelligence.

The DNI was not given the authority to challenge the Pentagon’s control of key intelligence agencies and their budgets, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not given a central depository to fill the analytical gaps between domestic and international terrorist threats.

Thus, the major problems exposed by 9/11 – the lack of a centralized repository of data and the need for more, rather than less, competitive analysis on terrorism – was repeated in the Christmas Day failure.

Finally, by making the DNI responsible for the daily briefing of the President, it ensured that the “tsar” would have little time to conceptualize and implement the strategic reforms that were needed.

President Barack Obama’s unwillingness to request a National Intelligence Estimate before making his decision late last year to increase military forces in Afghanistan revealed his lack of respect for the work of the intelligence community.

Myth Number Two: The intelligence community is a genuine community that fosters intelligence cooperation and the sharing of intelligence information. The intelligence community has never functioned as a community.

With the exception of the production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), which are indeed a corporate product of the community, there is limited sharing of the most important and sensitive documents collected by the various intelligence agencies, and very little esprit de corps within the community.

There have always been deep rivalries between civilian and military agencies, with the CIA and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence Research often lined up against the Defense Intelligence Agency and the four military intelligence branches.

This division was particularly profound during the debates over Soviet military power and the verification of Soviet and American arms control agreements, with military intelligence consistently exaggerating the strength of the Soviet military and opposing the disarmament agreements of the 1970′s and 1980′s.

The 9/11 and Christmas Day failures revealed continued parochialism and lack of cooperation within the community.

The intelligence community suffers from an inability to learn from its failures and successes. The CIA needs to emulate the U.S. Army, which routinely conducts after-action reports and boasts a Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The center has a small staff, takes advantage of teams of experts to investigate specific issues, and maintains a direct line of communication to senior military leaders to understand what needs to be examined.

Conversely, the CIA has resorted to a culture of cover-up to conceal failures such as the collapse of the Soviet Union; 9/11; the Iraq War; the Christmas Day event; and the suicidal bombing of the CIA’s most important facility in Afghanistan.

Myth Number Three: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence offers a genuine possibility for exercising central control over the intelligence community. The creation of the DNI has worsened the malaise within the CIA without reform for either the agency or the intelligence community.

The fact that the President had to meet with more than 20 intelligence principals to discuss the Christmas Day failure points to the crazy-quilt bureaucratic structure created in the wake of 9/11, as well as the lack of centralized authority and responsibility within the community.

The Pentagon has veto power over the DNI with respect to transferring personnel and budgetary authority from individual agencies into joint centers or other agencies. This fact undermines the possibility of any legitimate reform process.

The first DNI, John Negroponte, became frustrated and left suddenly in December 2006 for a lesser position at the State Department. His two successors have been retired naval admirals, Mike McConnell and Dennis Blair; neither has an understanding of the importance of strategic and long-term intelligence.

The DNI spends far too much time preparing for his daily briefing of the President, which should be in the hands of the CIA, and the issue of cyber-security, which should be in the hands of the NSA.

Instead of pursuing reform, Negroponte, McConnell and Blair have built a huge, lumbering and bloated bureaucracy that includes a principal deputy director, four deputy directors, three associate directors and no fewer than 19 assistant deputy directors.

The DNI has a huge budget (over $1 billion) and has taken its management staff from the CIA and INR, thus weakening the overall intelligence apparatus. There has been no real accountability of the DNI; Congressional intelligence oversight committees have failed to monitor the DNI’s hiring of contractors with extravagant salaries.

Myth Number Four: The CIA is not a policy agency, but is chartered to provide objective and balanced intelligence analysis to decision-makers without any policy axe to grind.

This is possibly the most harmful myth of all, because CIA’s covert action, which has registered a series of strategic disasters over the past 60 years, is part of the policy implementation process.

As a result, much clandestine collection over the years has been designed to collect information that supports policy.

The CIA was unfairly described 30 years ago as a “rogue elephant out of control.” In fact, the CIA is part of the White House policy process. Various presidents have authorized regime change in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, the Congo, the Dominican Republic and South Vietnam, which have had disastrous consequences for U.S. interests.

The White House authorized assassination plots in Cuba, the Congo and South Vietnam, and provided legal sanction for the CIA to create secret prisons, conduct torture and abuse, and pursue renditions, often involving totally innocent people without recourse to judicial proceedings.

Myth Number Five: The 9/11 and Christmas Day failures were due to the lack of sharing intelligence collection. The conventional wisdom is that the 9/11 intelligence failure was caused primarily by the failure to share intelligence, particularly the failure of the CIA to inform the FBI of the presence of two al-Qaeda operatives in the United States.

In actual fact, the problem was far more serious; it was a problem of sloppiness and incompetence in dealing with sensitive intelligence information.

It has been established that 50-60 analysts and operatives from the CIA, the FBI and the NSA had access to information that Khaled al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who had links to al-Qaeda, had entered the United States long before 9/11.

These analysts and operatives failed to inform leading officials at their own agencies of the two al-Qaeda operatives, who fell through the cracks of the system. Eight years later, the Nigerian bomber similarly escaped detection despite excellent intelligence collection that was seen by most intelligence agencies.

There is still an inadequate flow of information between intelligence agencies. The United States lacks one central depository for all information on national and international terrorism, and the proliferation of intelligence agencies makes sharing of intelligence products even more cumbersome.

The DNI and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) were created after 9/11 to make sure that intelligence was shared, but this led to a downgrading of the CIA and the lack of a single agency responsible for analyzing intelligence on terrorism.

Tremendous amounts of useful intelligence are collected, but intelligence analysis has not been appreciably improved.

The NSA had information on the Nigerian bomber that wasn’t shared with the CIA and the FBI; the CIA prepared a biographic study of the Nigerian bomber, which it didn’t share with NCTC. The State Department did not pursue whether the Nigerian bomber had a U.S. visa, let alone a multiple-entry visa, in his possession.

The so-called intelligence community lacks an effective computer system to coordinate all intelligence information, although it does have access to the State Department’s consular database-listing visa holders, which it failed to consult.

The DHS’s customs and border units had sufficient intelligence to interrogate the bomber when he landed in Detroit; its Transportation Security Agency lacked intelligence to keep him from boarding a plane to Detroit.

Myth Number Six: The CIA successfully recruits foreign assets. The CIA’s National Clandestine Service (NCS) relies on walk-ins and rarely recruits major espionage assets. The most successfulwalk-ins, moreover, such as Col. Oleg Penkovsky, often have great difficulty in getting CIA operatives to accept them.

The NCS has had little success in recruiting assets in the closed world of terrorism or in closed societies such as China, Iran and North Korea. Many of the agents recruited from Cuba, East Germany and the former Soviet Union were double agents reporting to their host governments. The suicide bomber in Afghanistan last month was a double agent.

The CIA has to rely on foreign intelligence liaison sources for sensitive intelligence collection and even the recruitment of foreign assets. There are few al-Qaeda operatives who have been killed or captured without the assistance of foreign liaison, particularly the Pakistani intelligence service.

But the suicide bomber at the CIA base in Afghanistan last month was recruited with the help of the Jordanian intelligence service, an extremely risky way to recruit assets; he was brought onto the base without proper inspection and met with more than a dozen officers.

The loss of top-ranking CIA operations officers in Afghanistan points to the need for a review of CIA clandestine operations. The current CIA director, a former congressman, has surrendered to the clandestine culture and cadre; he is unlikely to lead a reform movement.

And President Obama’s appointment of former CIA deputy director John McLaughlin, a master of the CIA cover-up over the past two decades, points to a continued cover-up.

Instead of a CIA outside the policy community telling truth to power, providing objective and balanced intelligence to policymakers and avoiding policy advocacy, as President Harry S. Truman wanted, we now have the CIA as a paramilitary organization.

Indeed, there has been a trend toward militarization of the entire intelligence community. In the Bush administration, the CIA was significantly weakened, with a director, Michael Hayden, who was a four-star general.

The Obama administration appointed a retired admiral to be the director of national intelligence, a retired general to be national security adviser, and retired generals to be ambassadors to key countries such as Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia.

By placing the position of the DNI in the hands of the military, the Bush and Obama administrations completed the militarization of the CIA and even the intelligence community itself, where active-duty and retired general officers run the Office of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office.

The Pentagon is responsible for nearly 90 percent of all personnel in the intelligence community and 85 percent of the community’s $75 billion budget.
The absence of an independent civilian counter to the power of military intelligence threatens civilian control of the decision to use military power and makes it more likely that intelligence will be tailored to suit the purposes of the Pentagon. This is exactly what President Truman wanted to prevent.

Finally, the Congressional intelligence oversight process has made no genuine effort to monitor CIA’s flawed intelligence analysis or its clandestine operations, and failed to challenge the illegal activities of the CIA that were part of the policy process.

The chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee has sat on her hands while CIA Director Leon Panetta methodically dismantled and marginalized the oversight responsibilities of the Office of the Inspector General.

Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA. [This story originally appeared at Truthout.org.]

The answer to that question is even more disturbing, as the video below explains:

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Yes, this Jordanian doctor was a double agent. This article, NBC: Al-Qaida Double-Agent Killed CIA Officers ; Officials: Perpetrator of Afghan attack was supposed to infiltrate al-Qaida, goes into more detail regarding how and why this attack was carried out:

The suicide bombing on a CIA base in Afghanistan last week was carried out by a Jordanian doctor who was an al-Qaida double-agent, Western intelligence officials told NBC News.

Initial reports said that the attack, which killed seven CIA officers, was carried out by a member of the Afghan National Army.

According to Western intelligence officials, the perpetrator was Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, 36, an al-Qaida sympathizer from Zarqa, which is also the hometown of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian militant Islamist believed responsible for several devastating attacks in Iraq.

Al-Balawi was arrested by Jordanian intelligence more than a year ago. He had moderated the main al-Qaida chat forum before his arrest and was known online as Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani.

“Abu Dujanah was an active member of jihadi forums,” said Evan Kohlmann, who tracks jihadi Web sites for NBC News. “He was actually an administrator on the now-defunct Al-Hesbah forum, previously al-Qaida’s main chat forum.”

The Jordanians believed that al-Balawi had been successfully reformed and brought over to the American and Jordanian side. They set him up as an agent and sent him to Afghanistan and Pakistan to infiltrate al-Qaida.

His specific mission, according to officials, was to find and meet Ayman al Zawahiri, al-Qaida’s No. 2, also a physician.

However, a Taliban spokesman, quoted on the Al-Jazeera Web site, said al-Balawi misled Jordanian and U.S. intelligence services for a year. The spokesman, Al-Hajj Ya’qub, promised to release a video confirming his account of the Afghanistan attack.

I cannot even begin to guess how it was determined that this doctor had “turned,” and was going to work against Al Qaeda. I leave such questions to Larry Johnson, a former CIA officer and expert on Counter-terrorism, who knows far more about this than I could ever even hope to, or want to, know (and you can catch a number of recent appearances by Larry Johnson on CNN discussing the CIA, Yemen, and TSA HERE). That a doctor could do this to other people, though, is just staggering to me It flies in the face of everything doctors are supposed to stand for: Do No Harm. Just like the Fort Hood terrorist, Army Major Nidal Hasan. How can this happen? What would drive someone whose life work is supposed to be helping people:

On martyrdom
After he arrived in Afghanistan last year, al-Balawi was interviewed by one of al-Qaida’s main Internet sites, the Vanguards of Khurasan, on the subject of martyrdom.

“When you ponder the verses and hadiths that speak about jihad and its graciousness, and then you let your imagination run wild to fly with what Allah has prepared for martyrs, your life become cheap for its purpose, and the extravagant houses and expensive cars and all the decoration of life become very distasteful in your eyes,” he told the interviewer.

He added, “They say ‘there’s love that kills.’ And I only see that as truthful in the love for jihad, as this love is either going to kill you in repentance should you choose to sit away from jihad, or will kill you as a martyr for the cause of Allah if you choose to go to Jihad, and the human must choose between these two deaths.”

Last week, according to the Western officials, al-Balawi reportedly called his handler to say he needed to meet with the CIA’s team based in Khost, Afghanistan, because he said he had urgent information he needed to relay about Zawahiri.

Ah yes – there it is. “There’s love that kills.” I have a fair amount of theological training, but I must say, this is a shocking interpretation, in my humble opinion, that is.

The doctor/bomber was convincing:

Close relations with Jordanian intelligence

His handler was a senior intelligence official, identified in Jordanian press accounts as Sharif Ali bin Zeid.

But bin Zeid was not just a Jordanian intelligence officer; he was also a member of the Jordanian royal family and was a first cousin of the king and grandnephew of the first king Abdullah.

Bin Zeid’s prominent role offers rare insight into the close partnership between American and Jordanian intelligence officials and how crucial their relationship has become to the overall counterterrorism strategy.

“We have a close partnership with the Jordanians on counterterrorism matters,” a U.S. official told The Washington Post. “Having suffered serious losses from terrorist attacks on their own soil, they are keenly aware of the significant threat posed by extremists.”

Jordan’s official news agency, Petra, said bin Zeid was killed “on Wednesday evening as a martyr while performing the sacred duty of the Jordanian forces in Afghanistan” and provided no further details about his death.

Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera reported that al-Balawi’s family refused to speak to the media on instructions from Jordanian security services.

Sources close to the family told Al-Jazeera’s Web site that Jordanian Intelligence arrested the perpetrator’s younger brother and ordered his father not to set up a condolence tent for his son so that it would not turn into a gathering place for jihadist sympathizers.

I would say that was the very least they could do, especially given this quote: “on Wednesday evening as a martyr while performing the sacred duty of the Jordanian forces in Afghanistan”…Holy shit.

This bombing has a huge impact, as one might imagine:

Key base for CIA

According to Western officials, bin Zeid, along with the seven CIA officers, were killed when al-Balawi, the formerly trusted informant turned double-agent, detonated his suicide belt at Camp Chapman.

Some of the officers had flown in from Kabul for what was thought to be an important meeting.

The base was used to direct and coordinate CIA operations and intelligence gathering in Khost, a hotbed of insurgent activity because of its proximity to Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, former CIA officials said. Among the CIA officers killed was the chief of the operation, they said.

Six other people were wounded in what was one of the worst attacks in CIA history.

A senior U.S. intelligence official told NBC the CIA is “looking closely at every aspect of the Khost attack.”

“The agency is determined to continue pursuing aggressive counterterrorism operations. Last week’s attack will be avenged. Some very bad people will eventually have a very bad day,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Qari Hussain, a top militant commander with the Pakistani Taliban who is believed to be a suicide bombing mastermind, said last week that militants had been searching for a way to damage the CIA’s ability to launch missile strikes on the Pakistani side of the border.

Using remote-controlled aircraft, the U.S. has launched scores of such missile attacks in the tribal regions over the past year and a half, aiming for high-value al-Qaida and other militant targets. The most successful strike, in August, killed former Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud at his father-in-law’s home.

The Washington Post reported Friday that the CIA base has been at the heart of overseeing this covert program. The newspaper cited two former intelligence officials who have visited Chapman as saying that U.S. personnel there are heavily involved in the selection of al-Qaida and Taliban targets for the drone aircraft strikes. (Richard Engel is NBC News Chief Foreign Correspondent; Robert Windrem is a senior NBC News Producer.)

I love a good spy thriller as much as the next person, but this isn’t Hollywood. What this tragedy brings home forcefully is that this is not a movie, this is not some script crafted by some Intelligence wannabe. This is real. Real people lost their lives in service to this country, a service that is too often unsung or unappreciated, getting recognition not for what goes right, but for what goes wrong. The work they do, often referred to as “cloak and dagger,” is beyond most of our imaginings. It is done, though, for our benefit, for our safety, for our protection. And those who lost their lives are real people, with families, with small children. They have devoted their lives to trying to stop the kinds of attacks we saw here on 9/11, to stop Al Qaeda. And they were betrayed by someone they thought they could trust.

Intelligence work, obviously, is not an exact science. How does one know for sure when someone is telling the truth, when someone is truly on your side? Sadly, in this one instance, they did not. And now, more stars will be going up on the wall.

If you are so inclined, there is a fund for the families of these fallen officers, which include 8 children. The address is: The CIA Officers Memorial Fund, c/o Arnold & Porter LLP, 555 12th Street NW, Washington, DC 20004.

Unlike previous reform proposals, the Brookings study manages to overlook the serious systemic issues that face the world of intelligence analysis and to propose a full slate of boilerplate steps. The author of the study is the well-known China scholar, Kenneth Lieberthal, who is the director of the John L. Thornton China Center at Brookings.
Since Lieberthal was a senior director for Asia on the National Security Council and a special assistant to President Bill Clinton for national security affairs and therefore a consumer of the government’s most sensitive intelligence analysis, his study is a particular disappointment.

What the CIA should be, what it should do, and what it should prepare to do is less clear than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War. There should have been major reform of the CIA and the IC with the end of the Cold War, but there was none. Sen. David Boren and Rep. David McCurdy, both Democrats, made attempts in 1992 and 1994 to reform the CIA, but there was great resistance from Republicans who were under the influence of the Pentagon, and there was no support from their Democratic colleagues.

The politicization of intelligence on the Soviet Union in the 1980s and the intelligence failures that contributed to the 9/11 attacks created other opportunities for reform, but the flawed thinking of the 9/11 Commission, the Congressional rush to judgment, and unwise pressures from the families of the 9/11 victims led to changes that made a bad situation worse.

The creation of a new bureaucracy under a Director of National Intelligence (DNI or the so-called intelligence tsar) beholden to the White House led to a more centralized system of intelligence that stifles creative thinking and runs the risk of more politicized intelligence. Lieberthal’s failure to critique the role of the DNI is one of the major shortcomings of his work.

The congressional, political, and academic critics outside of the intelligence community simply have no idea of the decline and despair within the CIA that has led to a major deterioration in the ability to prepare strategic intelligence and to inform the policy community. There is no consensus whatsoever on what is needed to reform the world of intelligence. The Congress is an unlikely source for conducting a reform effort; its modus operandi calls for throwing money at problems, but the needed reforms have nothing to do with additional funds.

There has never been a time in the nation’s history when so much money has been spent on intelligence with so little accountability and so few beneficial results. We learned today that the intelligence budget is $75 billion, which more than doubles the budget for the State Department and the Agency for International Development.

The serious problems that Lieberthal fails to address include the militarization of the IC, which must be reversed; the absence of congressional oversight over a flawed intelligence product that paved the way to the Iraq War, which must be ended; the ability of the National Clandestine Service to politicize intelligence analysis, which must be stopped; and the inability of CIA to tell truth to power, which finds the Agency without a moral compass.

The Bush administration boasted of a “marriage” between the Pentagon and the CIA, which indicated its support for an intelligence community subordinated to Pentagon priorities. The current intelligence tsar, retired Admiral Dennis Blair, has strengthened this marriage, which finds the Defense Department the chief operating officer of the $75 billion intelligence industry. The Pentagon controls more than 85 percent of the intelligence budget and nearly 90 percent of the 200,000 intelligence personnel.

Most collection requirements flow from the Pentagon, and deference within the policy and congressional communities for “support for the warfighter” has elevated tactical military considerations over strategic geopolitical considerations. The Pentagon has also moved into the fields of clandestine collection and covert operations, without the constraints of oversight that limit the covert actions of the CIA.

The decline of the CIA over the past two decades coincides with the end to oversight of the IC by the Senate and House intelligence committees. These committees have become advocates for the CIA—particularly for the clandestine world of spies and covert operations. In doing so, Congress has failed to make the CIA accountable for its transgressions and has ignored the major decline in the production of strategic intelligence. It took the Senate intelligence committee more than five years to issue a report on the Bush administration’s misuse of intelligence information, and even then it merely issued a majority-only written report.

Every congressional “reform” movement on CIA has started with the need for greater clandestine collection, particularly greater assets and personnel for the National Clandestine Service, which ignores the limits and myths of clandestine collection and exaggerates the value of human intelligence. The current CIA director, Leon Panetta, has been captured by the clandestine culture and cadre, and is unlikely to lead a reform movement. It is time to separate the CIA’s directorate of intelligence from the National Clandestine Service, but Lieberthal merely notes that there “strong arguments” for and against separation. Once upon a time, we counted on “independent” studies to resolve these arguments.

Unfortunately, Lieberthal takes the easy way out with a series of thumb sucking recommendations that do not address the problem of the decline of strategic intelligence. He calls for the creation of a National Intelligence University (!) with its own campus and faculty as well as “periodic formal training opportunities.” I would expect a distinguished academic such as Lieberthal to understand the difference between education and training.

He calls for greater hiring of “people who are in their late twenties or early thirties who have had extensive experience related to the country of concern,” which ignores the need to cross-fertilize the CIA with experienced analysts from the academic and think-tank worlds who have a little more grey hair than the average 20 or 30-something and more time overseas. These senior analysts would also be able to mentor the CIA’s analytic community, which is extremely young and inexperienced.

He calls for adding another layer of review, without acknowledging the petty tutelage that already exists in the review process and without endorsing the need for protecting contrarian and out-of-the-box thinking in the analytic process. Finally, Lieberthal recommends IC briefings to incoming policy makers in order to determine how policy makers “might best be served by the IC.”

Unfortunately, the CIA already spends too much time determining the interests of the policy maker and, as a result, often skews intelligence to serve those interests.
CIA directors Richard Helms, James Schlesinger, George H.W. Bush, William Casey, Robert Gates, George Tenet, and Porter Goss were guilty of politicizing intelligence, but Lieberthal doesn’t deal with the problem. The only protections against politicization are the integrity and honesty of the intelligence analysts themselves, as well as the protection of competitive analysis that serves as a safeguard against unchallenged acceptance of conventional wisdom.
The creation of a centralized director of national intelligence and the placement of key IC positions in the hands of the military do not augur well for the restoration of CIA’s moral compass.
_____

Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, is The Public Record’s National Security and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.

This op-ed was first published Sep. 14th at The Public Record and is reprinted with the express permission of Mel Goodman.

Although Holder’s inquiry will only target those who acted beyond so-called legal guidelines, Broder is concerned that we will ultimately see Vice President Dick Cheney “standing in the dock.” Broder should be concerned with the need to explicitly repudiate the policies and actions of President George Bush and Cheney that violated domestic and international law. These actions require a public hearing and an open record of some kind. Holder’s inquiry is the first step in what Mark Danner of the New York Review of Books called a “complicated political process.”

Broder’s lamest and most disingenuous reasons deal with CIA director Leon Panetta and the methodology of the Post’s news staff. Broder calls Panetta a “conscientious director” of the CIA, but Panetta has surrounded himself with the ideological drivers of the policies of detention and interrogation, Steve Kappes and Michael Sulick, and has fought every effort of the Obama administration to bring transparency and accountability to the Bush-Cheney policies.

Broder adds that Panetta’s “judgment” is supported by the reporting of Ignatius and others with “excellent sources inside the CIA.” Their sources, of course, are Kappes and Sulick, the very officers who seek to cover-up their own activities and have the freedom to talk to reporters. Good reporting and journalism require an honest effort to seek all sources and not merely those who reify one’s own positions.

Broder echoes Panetta when he argues that any investigation will have a “harmful effect on the morale and operations of his agency.” No, morale was compromised by high-level CIA officials such as George (“slam dunk”) Tenet, who tailored intelligence to go to war against Iraq, and Porter Goss and Michael Hayden, who used outside contractors to build secret prisons, conduct extraordinary renditions, and engage in torture and abuse.

The CIA Inspector General (IG) responsible for the 2004 report on interrogations and torture told Der Spiegel this week that he decided on preparing a report because “some agency employees involved with the program…were uneasy about it; he told the Washington Post last week that he “could not walk through the cafeteria without people walking up to me, not to complain but to say ‘More power to you.’”

CIA torture and abuse as well as extraordinary renditions also compromised valuable liaison relations with European intelligence services that are needed to combat international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a result of CIA’s illegal activities, intelligence services in Germany, Italy, and Spain were refusing to cooperate with their CIA counterparts. Nevertheless, the CIA is still resisting the release of hundreds of pages of internal documents on detentions and interrogations, arguing that national security is at stake. No, national embarrassment is involved and not national security.

At some point, Broder and his colleagues should be forced to read the 2004 IG Report on detentions and interrogations; the 2004 CIA report on interrogation techniques; the 2004 Taguba report on military abuse of detainees; the 2005 collection of “secret” documents by Karen Greenberg and Joshua Dratel in their The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib ; the 2007 International Committee of the Red Cross Report on CIA’s treatment of detainees; the 2008 Senate Armed Services report on U.S. treatment of detainees; and Jane Mayer’s book The Dark Side.

Then, they need to compare the treatment of the detainees, some of whom were totally innocent or erroneously detained, with what the Justice Department memoranda on interrogations permitted. Of course, Broder believes that the Justice Department torture memoranda demonstrate that the Bush administration engaged in a “deliberate, and internally well-debated policy decision, made in the proper places…by the proper officials.” Meanwhile, the Post has presented no evidence of policy debates on torture and abuse, extraordinary renditions, and secret prisons.

Broder and his colleagues could also try to interview those individuals who watched some or all of the 92 torture tapes before they were destroyed by high-ranking officials from the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. This destruction of evidence has been investigated for the past two years by John Durham, who will conduct the current inquiry for Attorney General Holder.

Broder, Ignatius, Hiatt, and Cohen have relied entirely on those CIA operatives who are trying to put the best possible face on CIA transgressions; the ethics of good journalism requires that they seek sources to learn about the details of the sordid and sadistic activities that put the nation at risk. President Barack Obama should be credited with closing the secret prisons and ending the practice of torture and abuse, but the nation still needs to confront and understand the evidence and the events of the past six years.

Finally, the news and editorial reporters of the Washington Post need to compare their findings of the evidence with the laws that govern the illegalities that have taken place. They could start with the 8th amendment of the Constitution against “cruel and unusual punishments” (it has the virtue of being short); the War Crimes Act of 1996; the Convention against Torture of 1984 (yes, the United States is a signatory); and of course Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions.

Broder and his colleagues do not understand that the stature of international and domestic law is diminished when a nation violates it with impunity. The stature of a nation is diminished when it commits crimes against humanity. And the national leadership and the nation itself are diminished when it ignores the need for accountability and explicit repudiation. Sen. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., had it right when he called for a “truth commission” to gather information on the CIA programs that the Bush administration endorsed and protected.

This would represent a good start in restoring our moral compass on the crimes of the post-9/11 era. The judgment of history will be harsh if we choose not to do so.

***
Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, is The Public Record’s National Security and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.

This op-ed was first published Sep. 3rd at The Public Record and is reprinted with the express permission of Mel Goodman.

President Barack Obama is permitting CIA Director Leon Panetta to weaken the Agency’s’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). The OIG has produced the only official and authoritative study of the abuses of the CIA detentions and interrogations program; it also has published seminal studies of the CIA’s involvement in the shoot down of a missionary plane in Peru in 2001 (and the subsequent cover-up of its role) as well as the controversial 9/11 accountability study.

These reports angered senior CIA managers and led to efforts by three successive directors (George Tenet, Porter Goss, and General Michael Hayden) to restrict the investigative work of the office. Panetta is continuing the campaign they began. Although John Helgerson, the inspector general who produced these reports, announced his retirement seven months ago, Panetta and the White House have not named a replacement. They clearly prefer that the OIG remain without the strong leadership it requires to pursue difficult investigations in the face of management resistance.

The creation of an independent, statutory OIG at CIA resulted from the Agency’s involvement in the Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s. CIA’s internal investigation of its role in that scandal was inadequate, particularly in comparison with congressional and independent investigations. CIA had an administrative inspector general, but he was appointed by the CIA director, had limited access to sensitive information, and had no more than a handful of professionals on his staff.

The congressional oversight committees were not given full access to his reports and not even the Justice Department received all IG reports of suspected illegalities. In fact, it was the efforts of CIA director William Casey to prevent the Attorney General from receiving reports on Iran Contra illegalities that led Senators Arlen Specter and John Glenn to sponsor a bill to create an independent IG, appointed by the President and responsible to Congress.

CIA director William Webster opposed the bill, and President George H.W. Bush signed it reluctantly in 1989; as a former CIA director, Bush feared that an independent IG would be “out of control,” a junkyard dog that could not be controlled by the bureaucracy. Bush waited a year before appointing Frederick Hitz, a lawyer and former CIA operations officer, as the first statutory IG. Hitz and his successors did perform independently, producing reports critical of the Agency’s performance in a number of areas.

Helgerson, appointed in 2002, proved more tenacious than many expected, even criticizing CIA director Tenet and other senior CIA leaders in the 9/11 report. His tenacity angered Agency directors, however, and they have subsequently tried to weaken the office, primarily by attacking the professionalism of its work.

If the Agency’s director believes the work of the OIG is flawed, he has several options. He can go to Congress, the president’s intelligence oversight board, the President’s Commission on Integrity and Efficiency—the watchdog of the government’s inspectors general—even to the president himself. Instead, CIA’s leadership chose to mount an unprecedented attack on the OIG.

In 2006, in an effort to intimidate the OIG, Goss ordered a leak investigation that led to the unprecedented polygraphing of the IG himself and the firing of a senior OIG official for having unreported conversations with journalists—even though the conversations had nothing to do with the leak investigation.

Hayden, seeking to rein in the OIG, appointed a special assistant, Robert Deitz, to ”investigate” the office, an action that infringed on the IG’s independence and that Congress should have stopped immediately. (Deitz was Hayden’s General Counsel at the National Security Agency when Hayden was director there, and crafted the internal legal opinions to justify warrantless eavesdropping.) Deitz’s so-called investigation was designed to intimidate the OIG.

Hitz, who had served as IG from 1990 to 1998, labeled Hayden’s internal investigation an effort to “call off the dogs.” He said that it would “lead to an undercutting of the IG’s authority and his ability to investigate allegations of wrongdoing.” It is difficult enough to gain cooperation from the rank and file for an IG investigation; once Agency officers understand that their leadership is not respectful of the office, the OIG’s ability to ferret out the truth becomes far more difficult.

Hayden’s intimidation campaign ignored provisions in the 1989 law that required the CIA director to inform the Congress of any attempt to hinder the IG in the execution of his duties. His efforts were consistent with the Bush administration’s campaign to weaken the role of the IG throughout the government, including trying to limit a bill in the House of Representatives to strengthen the independence of IGs by giving them seven-year terms and to permit the White House to fire them only for cause.

Helgerson announced his retirement the same week Panetta was confirmed as CIA director. Panetta, however, has not named a new IG and has continued to convey disapproval of the work of the office by his defense of actions that were criticized in the IG’s report on detentions and interrogations. Perhaps as a result, Helgerson has started talking to journalists. This is an unusual step for a CIA officer, even one who is retired; it is particularly surprising for Helgerson, who is extremely discrete.

In a statement last week, Helgerson emphasized that the CIA had conducted waterboarding in a manner inconsistent with the understanding between the CIA and the Justice Department and that the CIA had reneged on its assurance that repetitive use of this technique would “not be substantial.” Helgerson concluded that the CIA was “abusing this technique.”

Helgerson also questioned whether it had been necessary to use “enhanced interrogation techniques” and recommended the creation of a panel of experts to “evaluate the quality of intelligence gained as related to the specific techniques used.” Helgerson took issue with Panetta’s claim that the CIA itself had commissioned the OIG’s 2004 study, stating that he had initiated the 2004 report because many officers had told him that CIA techniques were “fundamentally inconsistent with long established U.S. Government policy and with American values, and were based on strained legal reasoning.”

Helgerson added that he “could not walk through the cafeteria without people walking up to me, not to complain but to say ‘More power to you.’” He emphasized that it is the mission of the IG to make sure that CIA operations are “efficient, effective, and run in a manner that is consistent with law and regulation, and to recommend improvements as appropriate.” He expressed particular disappointment with the fact that all ten of the OIG’s recommendations had been redacted.

The fact that Panetta and President Obama have not nominated an individual to replace Helgerson is not surprising. It is surprising, however, that both Senator Dianne Feinstein, the chairman of the Senate intelligence committee and Congressman Silvestre Reyes, chairman of the House intelligence committee, have ignored the issue. The weakening of the OIG by CIA leadership is an affront to Congress, particularly to Feinstein and Reyes; they are demonstrating a dereliction of duty.

Panetta and the White House are obviously slow rolling the appointment, leaving a weak acting IG in place as long as possible, probably searching for just the right candidate to acquiesce in their campaign to weaken the only effective oversight body that exists to investigate CIA activities.

***
Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, is The Public Record’s National Security and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA .

This op-ed was first published Sep. 2nd at The Public Record and is reprinted with the express permission of Mel Goodman.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, was photographed shortly after his capture during a raid in Pakistan on March 1, 2003.

The lead story in today’s Washington Post, headlined “How a Detainee Became An Asset,” provides a one-sided and distorted account of the torture and abuse of Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM) and demonstrates the need for a blue ribbon bipartisan commission to create a comprehensive and authoritative narrative of the misgovernment of the Bush administration over the past eight years.

The prosecution of low-level CIA officials and government contractors for resorting to torture and abuse beyond the sordid guidelines of the Justice Department will allow the major players of the Bush administration as well as the lawyers of the Justice Department to escape retribution and judgment. Since President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney would never be held accountable, the entire nation would be better served by a full understanding of the war crimes that they authorized in our name.

Today’s article argues that the techniques of torture and abuse turned KSM into the CIA’s “preeminent source” on al-Qaeda. Citing an intelligence assessment by the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center, which was presumably prepared for Vice President Cheney, the Post article argues that waterboarding was the key to breaking KSM’s spirit and eliciting valuable intelligence on the “inner workings of al-Qaeda and the group’s plans, ideology, and operatives.”

This view contradicts the findings of the authoritative 2004 report on detainees and interrogations of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as well as the personal views of the Inspector General (IG) himself.

As the Post acknowledges, John Helgerson, the former IG who commissioned the 2004 study, said that the work of the OIG did not permit “definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of particular interrogation methods.” Helgerson acknowledged that waterboarding and sleep deprivation “elicited a lot of information,” but the OIG didn’t “do a careful, systematic analysis of the use of particular techniques with particular individuals and independently confirm the quality of the information that came out.”

As a result, Helgerson recommended (but the Post article chose to omit) the creation of an independent panel of experts to “systematically evaluate the quality of the intelligence gained as related to the specific techniques used, or not used, in particular cases. This would clarify the value of the information and the utility of various approaches.” This recommendation was one of ten recommendations in the 2004 IG report; unfortunately, the Justice Deparment (presumably due to the importuning of the CIA) chose to redact all ten IG recommendations from the declassified report.

There is ample testimony to challenge the view that torture and abuse worked. There were FBI agents at the site where KSM was held who testified that torture and abuse didn’t lead to eliciting valuable intelligence. And a CIA operative has noted that KSM was willing to talk before being tortured, noting that “tea and crumpets” were all that was needed. The former head of U.S. Army intelligence, Gen. John Kimmons, remarked in 2006 that “No good intelligence is going to come from abusive practices. I think history tells us that.

I think the empirical evidence of the last five years, hard years, tells us that.” And more recently, several veteran FBI and military interrogators called for an investigation of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques (EIT),” because of their concerns about the legality, morality, and effectiveness of EITs.

It is important to remember that the 2004 IG report emphatically stated that the information elicited by torture and abuse “did not uncover any evidence that [any] plots were imminent.” Other CIA memoranda stated that information gained from detainees led to “arrests [that] disrupted attack plans in progress,” but did not attribute this information to the use of torture and abuse.

The IG study could not even determine if the 83 waterboardings given to Abu Zubaydah were the reason for his increased willingness to talk. The study noted, moreover, that torture was contrary to the Eighth Amendment against “cruel and unusual punishments;” the 1984 UN Torture Convention, which the United States took the lead in drafting and ratifying; and domestic law.

Finally, it is more important to remember that torture and abuse are evil. Illegal, immoral, counter-productive, but most importantly evil. George Bush told a press conference in 2005 that “this country does not believe in torture,” but the fact is we conducted torture on those who were guilty and those who were innocent.

And Dick Cheney, who has fanatically been waging his own personal jihad in defense of torture and abuse, told Fox News in an interview that will air tomorrow that CIA interrogators were justified in exceeding even the broad authorizations provided by the Justice Department, suggesting that the ends justify the means. Perhaps the Washington Post could give front-page coverage to the 18-page memorandum that the CIA gave to the DoJ’s Office of Legal Counsel in 2004, which provides extraordinary details of the interrogations in plain, but sordid and sadistic, language.

Two years ago, then CIA director Michael Hayden released a collection of long-secret documents compiled in 1974 that detailed domestic spying, assassination plots, and other CIA misdeeds in the 1960s and early 1970s. In releasing the documents, known as the “family jewels,” Hayden told a group of historians who had been pressing for greater disclosure from the Agency, that the documents provided a “glimpse of a very different time and a very different agency.” He also stated that, when the government withholds information, myth and misinformation “fill the vacuum like a gas.”

In order to prevent the Washington Post and others from adding to the myths and misinformation of torture and abuse, it is time to appoint a blue ribbon commission to study all aspects of the CIA’s detentions and interrogations policies.

Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, is The Public Record’s National Security and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA.

The Washington Post’s David Ignatius simply cannot get off the wheel he spins for the Central Intelligence Agency. Only two days after the release of the 2004 CIA study of the detention and interrogation program, which provides sordid and sadistic details of an illegal and immoral program, Ignatius still opposes any criminal review of the conduct of CIA officers and echoes the CIA line that it is “glad to be out” of the interrogation business. He even cites deputy director of the CIA, Stephen Kappes, one of the key ideological drivers for the policy of detention and interrogation, as someone who “doesn’t want to have anything to do with interrogation.”

Ignatius strongly believes that it is time for the CIA to “get on with it,” which was the signature line of former CIA director Richard Helms, who Ignatius considers the “savviest spymaster this country has produced.” Let’s forget that Helms lied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1973 on the overthrow of the elected government in Chile and that a grand jury was called to see if he should be indicted for perjury. Let’s forget that the Justice Department brought a lesser charge against Helms, who pleaded nolo contendere, and was fined $2,000 and given a two-year suspended prison sentence. And let’s forget that Helms was the major supporter of James Jesus Angleton, the crazed head of CIA counterintelligence for 20 years, who believed that the KGB had successfully penetrated the Agency. We called Angleton “The Ghost” when I was at the CIA because no one had ever seen the man. And it was “The Ghost” who befriended Kim Philby, the Soviet spy from British intelligence, introduced him to high-level CIA officials, and defended him to the end. So much for counterintelligence.

In his efforts to prevent any investigation of the CIA’s interrogation program, Ignatius has also forgotten the lessons of the Nuremberg Trials in 1945-1946. The International Tribunal taught us that crimes committed by individuals for state purposes were the responsibility of those individuals and punishable by state law. And, most importantly, following orders was not a defense. But Ignatius believes that all of the relevant evidence on torture and abuse was seen by “career prosecutors, who decided against bringing cases.” So, let’s forget that the career prosecutors were employed by the politicized Justice Department of the Bush administration and that they reported to a politically-appointed assistant attorney general.

Ignatius believes that investigation and accountability will hurt the Agency. It will actually restore the credibility of the Agency and lead to greater cooperation from important foreign intelligence services, which is essential to combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It was CIA crimes such as secret prisons and extraordinary renditions that hurt the Agency, and led to reticence about sharing intelligence. For example, there is no intelligence service within the European Union that would assist in a rendition by the CIA; no EU country that would permit the CIA to transport a prisoner by aircraft; no EU country that would agree to a secret prison or “black site” within its borders.

Ignatius also reveals that he knows nothing about loyal dissent. He argues that “questioning presidential orders isn’t really the job” of the CIA leadership, “especially when those orders are backed by Justice Department legal opinions.” This country has fought two unnecessary wars in the past 45 years with the deaths of more than 60,000 American men and women simply because high-level officials failed to expose the deceptions and manipulations of the Johnson and Bush administrations. In supporting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Ignatius and the Washington Post appear enamored with U.S. military power, with the Post providing few opportunities for contrarian voices to be heard. The mainstream media, particularly the Post, has been far too complacent in holding the Bush and Obama administration’s feet to the fire in the case of these wars.

Finally, Ignatius claims that the CIA resorted to independent contractors for help in “waterboarding” and assassination programs because of a lack of expertise. In fact, the CIA turned to outside help in these egregious areas because it was trying to avoid accountability and there was internal resistance to both programs. There were many officers in the National Clandestine Service opposed to the renditions and detentions program; the Office of Medical Service had serious problems with the waterboarding program, which is outlined in the 2004 Inspector General Program. Presumably, there were some greybeards around who mentioned that resorting to Blackwater to run an assassination program resembled the CIA’s contacts with the Mafia in the early 1960s to kill Castro. The CIA assassination program led to the Church Commission hearings in the 1970s, which placed restrictions on covert action programs and created a congressional oversight process that has fallen into disarray.

It is unbelievable that Ignatius could read the chilling and appalling 2004 IG report and not temper some of his views. His continued support of the CIA points to fanaticism and reminds me of Stalin’s reference to Western journalists who defended Soviet policy—he called them “useful idiots.”

Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, is The Public Record’s National Security and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA http ://www.amazon.com/Failure-Intelligence-Decline-Fall-CIA/dp/0742551105.

The Washington Post continues to campaign against any accountability for the detentions policies of the Central Intelligence Agency, using its own editorials and oped writers as well as outsiders who support the efforts of the newspaper.

Today, one day after the release of the 2004 CIA inspector general report that documented the use of torture and abuse, a Post editorial actually claimed that “it’s impossible to say, on the basis of information made public so far, whether prosecution is warranted” and that, since the Bush Justice Department already declined prosecution, it would be “unsettling” to pursue even those CIA operatives who used “unauthorized, improvised, inhumane and undocumented” techniques.

The Post is willing to exonerate these operatives because they were “clamoring” constantly for guidance about what it should and should not do; in fact, CIA director George Tenet and Deputy Director John McLaughlin were more interested in protection than guidance.

On Monday, the paper went judge-shopping in the courthouse and published an oped by Jeffrey H. Smith, who is a well-known lawyer with Arnold & Porter, one of Washington’s most prestigious law firms, and the CIA general counsel from 1995-1996. Smith created the most fatuous argument of all for not prosecuting the interrogators and apparently has no understanding of the Nuremberg Laws, which declared that following orders was no defense and that crimes committed by individuals for state purposes were the responsibility of individuals and were punishable under law.

Smith concedes that “we lost our bearings” after the 9/11 attacks and “squandered our credibility,” but fails to acknowledge the sordid and sadistic activities that the nation sponsored and the CIA implemented. His six reasons range from the disingenuous to the downright unconscionable.

Reason #1: The CIA techniques were authorized by the president, approved by the Justice Department, and briefed to the proper congressional committees. Since the techniques were “legal,” it will be “very difficult” to pursue prosecutions. The fact is we simply don’t know if all techniques were actually authorized, which is a major reason for an investigation, and the Justice Department is emphasizing those techniques that went beyond authorization. The level of difficulty of the prosecution is not a reason to stand down in this case, particularly since U.S. laws and Constitutional amendments were broken. The fact that high-level CIA officials destroyed the torture tapes suggests that there were actions that went beyond the Bush administration’s mandate and that sordid and sadistic acts were committed.

Reason #2: Since the CIA provided its 2004 report to the Justice Department and the department refused to prosecute any CIA officers, it would be “dangerous to settle policy difference at the expense of career officers. This, of course, is arrant nonsense! Bush’s Justice Department was a politicized government agency that has come under intense scrutiny because of its handling of the firing of U.S. attorneys as well as issues related to interrogation policy. The decisions on the 2004 report were made by prosecutors and lawyers who reported to a politically-appointed assistant in the Attorney General’s office. John Ashcroft was the attorney general and he lied to congressional committees.

Reason #3: After the Justice Department declined to prosecute, the CIA took administrative action, including disciplinary action against those officers whose conduct it deemed warranted such responses. This is a misinformed statement or an outright lie! No high-level Agency official has suffered as a result of the conduct of torture and abuse, which conforms to previous CIA misdeeds. High-level officials who politicized intelligence for Deputy Director Robert Gates in the 1980s did not suffer; officials who crafted Secretary of State Colin Powell’s phony speech to the UN prior to the Iraq War did not suffer; analysts who lied about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction did not suffer. In fact, the record clearly states that guilty parties in all of these affairs saw their careers prosper.

Reason #4: “Prosecuting CIA officers risks chilling current intelligence operations. Such prosecutions are likely to create cynicism in the clandestine service, which is deeply corrosive to any professional service.” This is Smith’s most fatuous argument and the one that CIA director Leon Panetta is peddling to the congress and the American people. The fact is that the failure to hold wrongdoers accountable is corrosive to morale and that CIA directors Tenet and Goss had to resort to independent contractors because so many professional Agency officers refused to take part in illegal activities. IG John Helgerson commissioned the 2004 study because so many Agency officers “expressed to me personally their feelings that what the Agency was doing was fundamentally inconsistent with long-established US Government policy and with American values, and was based on strained legal reasoning.”

Reason #5: Prosecutions could deter cooperation with other nations. Smith could not be more wrong! It was the CIA’s policies of secret prisons, erroneous renditions, and torture and abuse that corroded the liaison efforts of the Western intelligence network, which is the key to a successful campaign against international terrorism. European agencies became reticent to share intelligence with the United States because they were opposed to CIA’s abusive practices. The evidence is ample here and presumably even Smith must know this.

Reason #6: President Obama does not want to be distracted by looking backward and coping with congressional investigations and grand jury subpoenas. We as a nation must know the full extent of the Bush administration’s misuse of government agencies and government personnel. We need to know what happened in order to make sure that this kind of activity can never happen again.

Smith’s exculpatory brief on the behalf of his putative clients, the Washington Post and the CIA, is particularly disgraceful in view of the unconscionable activities that have taken place over the past decade. In order to restore the credibility of our intelligence services, permit foreign intelligence agencies to cooperate with us, and reverse the damage that has been done to U.S. foreign and national security, we must know the full extent of the role of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Melvin A. Goodman, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University, is The Public Record’s National Security and Intelligence columnist. He spent 42 years with the CIA, the National War College, and the U.S. Army. His latest book is Failure of Intelligence: The Decline and Fall of the CIA .